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Old 31-10-2010, 12:00 AM   #1
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Exclamation Wannabe Cult Leader - Iconoclast (Paul Ironshore)

[big]Wannabe Cult Leader - Iconoclast (Paul Ironshore)[/big]

Release Notes

Wannabe cult leader Iconoclast (Paul Ironshore) called me to spew his nonsense
about how everybody is a cult zombie except for himself. Ironshore claims to follow his own
"Knowing" type religion and just doesn't understand how he is a contradiction.

While having a temper tantrum over his misinformed delusions, Iconoclast hung up the
phone and continued on with his ego driven lies!

Mp3 Download link:


From The Bunker-Exposing Iconoclast radio for what it is


This broadcast is dealing with the delusional rantings of iconoclast radio from last week. He will expose himself with his own words on being delusional, a liar, and a hypocrite. Most of you here already know all these thing's, but I felt I needed to set the record straight and here it is. I hope you enjoy this unusual broadcast of From the Bunker. Normality will continue next week...

Mp3 download link:


Iconoclast Radio - On The Rastagnostic Show


This is a show by Rastagnostic in 2009 where he punks Iconoclast Radio.
Iconoclast did not know who Rastagnostic was, and fell victim into his spider web.
You can find Rastagnostic on Revere Radio Network.

Thought it was funny and wanted to share it with my listeners.

Iconoclast Radio is requesting a money bomb of $250 to raise money for studio Equipment. Unlike Alex Jones Iconoclast Radio will account for every penny.
If you would rather buy the equipment that is also an option.
If 25 people sends just $10 Iconoclast Radio can produce a quality show.

Iconoclast freaks out about Willie Nelson dumping in the bed and goes off!

Mp3 download link:



Last edited by shure; 31-10-2010 at 12:59 AM.
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Old 10-01-2011, 06:49 AM   #2
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I find Ironshores to be a solid investigator despite the fact that I do not fully accept all of his ideas.

He has done a good job of exposing dis-informants such as Alex Jones. Jones is a millionaire who has been a useful tool of the Zionist criminal network.

Asking listeners for donations is not a crime. Assisting the crime syndicate is a crime.

Ironshores is going to be a part of a badly needed awakening.
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Old 02-06-2011, 12:46 PM   #3
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Name Register # Age-Race-Sex Release Date
1. PAUL EBANKS 18381-050 39-Black-M 08-25-2005 RELEASED


Iconoclast AKA Paul Ironshore Real name: Paul Ebanks History: He created an drug empire and forced weak, poor people to work for him by threatening and beating them, then he ratted them all out in order? to get a lighter federal prison sentence. It has also been reported that Paul has had recent contacts with the Sinaloa drug cartel and worked with the FBI and DHS to frame an American Patriot for a crime they did not commit.

Fun facts: His father is a Freemason, is addicted to Valium, was forced into prison prostitution.

Hatred of Judaism? How about hatred of Jews? How about rank anti-semitism?

This piece of filth goes by the name Paul Ironshore

Real name: PAUL J. EBANKS [Yemach Shmo u'Zikro!!!]

Phone: 302-566-1943- Call this racist now 24/7 and give no rest to this fraud and evil wicked piece of filth and oxygen thief.

Address: 49 Howell #1, Dover, DE 19901-

He is a ex-felon who was head of a drug dealing organization and ratted (snitched) out all those under him in order to get a life sentence. He says that his main goal in life is “to be the most vicious anti-Semite in the English-speaking world”. Paul is also a neo nazi and is associated with terrorists he hates and wants to KILL ALL JEWS, He has not learned his lesson from prison and still sells drugs,

I publicly challenge Paul to file a civil suit against me, along with anyone else I have called out. Bring it dont sing it

Ps: Dont forget to bring your body bag


U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals
No. 955917u


v. No. 95-5917

BERNARD KING, a/k/a Shaborn,

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Norfolk.
Rebecca B. Smith, District Judge.

Argued: March 7, 1997

Decided: July 22, 1997

Before ERVIN, WILKINS, and NIEMEYER, Circuit Judges.

__________________________________________________ _______________

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

__________________________________________________ _______________


ARGUED: William P. Robinson, Jr., ROBINSON, BANKS &
ANDERSON, Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellant. Alexander Young
Thomas, Special Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.
ON BRIEF: Helen F. Fahey, United States Attorney, OFFICE OF
THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Alexandria, Virginia, for

__________________________________________________ _______________

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).

__________________________________________________ _______________



A jury convicted Bernard King of conspiracy to distribute and to
possess with the intent to distribute crack cocaine, and the court sen-
tenced him to a term of life in prison. On appeal, King contends that
he is entitled to a new trial because (1) the district court accepted the
government's racially neutral rationale for striking three black venire-
men, (2) the district court refused to give the duress instruction which
King requested, and (3) the evidence to support the conclusion that
King participated in the conspiracy willingly was insufficient. King
also challenges aspects of his sentence. Finding no reversible error,
we affirm.


In the summer of 1991 King acted as a middleman and coordinator
in a New York-based drug deal which went awry when the cocaine
supplier absconded with $180,000 in cash without delivering cocaine
to the buyer, Paul Ebanks. Ebanks held King accountable, and one of
Ebanks' associates, Robert Bruce Gillins, took King into custody at
gunpoint, hit him, and threatened him in an attempt to recover the
money. When Gillins ultimately became satisfied that King had not
planned the $180,000 fiasco, Gillins agreed to accept $20,000 from
King and let him "work off the debt" by helping Ebanks and Gillins
distribute cocaine. After paying Ebanks $20,000, which King
obtained from his mother, King agreed to go to Virginia to sell crack
cocaine. King sold crack for nearly two years as a member of the
Ebanks/Gillins conspiracy in the Norfolk, Virginia area, "controlling"
distribution in parts of the city. As one co-conspirator later testified,
King was free to do as he wished and could have left the conspiracy,
but "there was no reason to leave." King's enterprise flourished until
the conspiracy unraveled and he was arrested.


King contends that at the beginning of trial, the government struck
three black women from the jury panel, denying him equal protection.
In Batson v. Kentucky,
476 U.S. 79
(1986), the Supreme Court held
that the racially motivated use of peremptory challenges violates the
equal protection provisions of the Constitution. If the defendant estab-
lishes a prima facie showing that the prosecutor struck black panel
members in circumstances that raise an inference of racially moti-
vated exclusion, the burden shifts to the government to articulate a
neutral justification for its use of the peremptory challenges. The
defense then bears the burden of establishing that any facially neutral
justifications given by the government are pretextual. We review a
district court's rejection of Batson challenges for clear error. See
United States v. Johnson, 54 F.3d 1150, 1163 (4th Cir. 1995).

In response to the defendant's Batson challenge in this case, the
government explained that it had struck two potential jurors because
they were unemployed and a third because she was a housewife of
about the same age as King's mother, who was scheduled to testify.
In each case, the government expressed concern that the juror might
too easily sympathize with the defendant and defense witnesses.

"[W]hile prosecutors may not challenge prospective jurors because
of their race, they are ordinarily . . . entitled to exercise permitted
peremptory challenges for any reason at all, as long as that reason is
related to [their] view concerning the outcome of the case to be tried."
United States v. Lane, 866 F.2d 103, 106 (4th Cir. 1989) (internal
quotes omitted). Thus, Batson does not provide grounds for the defen-
dant to contest peremptory challenges based on potential jurors' cur-
rent and past employment. See id. And it does not reach the
prosecution's perception that, without regard to race, a potential juror
is situated similarly to a witness, with whom that potential juror might
sympathize. Accordingly, we cannot conclude that the district court
clearly erred in finding that the government's explanations were not


King next contends that the court erred in failing to give the jury
the duress instruction that he had requested. We review the district
court's decisions on giving a particular form of jury instruction under
an abuse of discretion standard. See United States v. Abbas, 74 F.3d
506, 513 (4th Cir. 1996). "We will not reverse a conviction based on
improper jury instructions as long as the instructions given by the dis-
trict court, as a whole, included the substance of the defendant's
requested . . . charge." United States v. Heater, 63 F.3d 311, 326 (4th
Cir. 1995).

At trial, King contended that his participation in the conspiracy was
the product of duress in the form of threats against him and his fam-
ily. Accordingly, he submitted the following proposed instruction to
the district court:

The Court instructs the jury that the defendant's conduct in
the instant case may be justified if the evidence supports the
following: 1) That the defendant was under unlawful and
present threat of death or serious bodily injury; 2) That the
defendant did not recklessly place himself in a situation
where he would be forced to engage in criminal conduct; 3)
That the defendant reasonably believed that he had no legal
alternative but to commit the criminal act in order to avoid
death or serious bodily harm; 4) That there existed a direct
causal relationship between the criminal activity and the
avoidance of the threatened harm.

The district court initially declined to give the instruction on the
ground that the evidence did not support the four elements in the
instruction. However, when King's counsel argued to the jury what
amounted to a duress defense, the court determined that the jury
should be given some legal instruction to enable them to address the
defense. Accordingly, the court gave the requested instruction except
that it altered the introductory statement to say,"defendant's conduct
in the instant case may not be justified by a defense of duress unless
the evidence supports the following . . . four elements. . . . The burden
is upon the defendant to show all four of these elements." When the
court asked counsel if there was any objection to the jury charge,
King's counsel responded, "Except for one instruction we didn't get
-- but actually got -- yes, no objections to the charge."

Even if King effectively objected to the instruction that the court
gave, we find no error in the duress instruction that was given. See
United States v. Crittendon, 883 F.2d 326, 330 (4th Cir. 1989) (setting
forth four elements of duress defense).


In a related argument, King contends the evidence was insufficient
to support the conclusion that his participation in the conspiracy was
knowing, willful and intentional. In assessing a challenge to the suffi-
ciency of the evidence, we must uphold a conviction"if there is sub-
stantial evidence, taking the view most favorable to the Government,
to support it." Glasser v. United States,
315 U.S. 60, 80
(1942). We
must give the prosecution the benefit of direct as well as circumstan-
tial evidence and must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the
prosecution. See United States v. Tresvant, 677 F.2d 1018, 1021 (4th
Cir. 1982).

Evidence was introduced that other members of the conspiracy
considered King to be "part of the family," rather than an unwilling
participant. Indeed, the evidence indicated that when drugs were
turned over to King for distribution, he was neither threatened nor
forced to take them. Instead, "he was just relaxed, like he's ready for
the stuff, to go get rid of it, whatever he got to do with it." Finally,
he continued to distribute drugs in Virginia through his own agents
for nearly two years. This evidence is sufficient to support a conclu-
sion that King willingly participated in the conspiracy.


Finally, King challenges his sentence, arguing that the court erred
in enhancing his offense level by applying U.S.S.G.S 3B1.1(b)
(supervisory role) and U.S.S.G. S 2D1.1(b)(1) (possession of a fire-
arm) and in sentencing King under the provision for cocaine base
rather than cocaine powder. All three assignments of error challenge
factual determinations made by the district court, which we review for
clear error. See United States v. Falesbork, 5 F.3d 715, 722 (4th Cir.
1993) (reviewing factual conclusion on the defendant's role in the
offense for clear error); United States v. Apple , 915 F.2d 899, 914 (4th
Cir. 1990) (reviewing factual conclusion of whether a firearm was
possessed for clear error).

Because witnesses testified that King had six people working for
him in the distribution of crack cocaine and King himself said that he
provided crack to five others for their distribution, we conclude that
the district court did not clearly err in finding King to be a supervisor
for purposes of the three-level enhancement authorized by U.S.S.G.
S 3B1.1(b). Similarly, because of King's own admission that he car-
ried a 9 mm handgun which Gillins gave him to protect the drugs, the
district court had sufficient evidence to support its finding that King
possessed a weapon for purposes of the two-level enhancement of
U.S.S.G. S 2D1.1(b)(1). Finally, we cannot conclude that the district
court clearly erred in sentencing King under U.S.S.G. S 2D1.1(c)(1)
for cocaine base (crack), rather than cocaine powder, because King's
counsel stipulated to the accuracy of lab reports which revealed that
the substance seized from King and his co-conspirators was crack

Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is




107 F.3d 868

NOTICE: Fourth Circuit Local Rule 36(c) states that citation of unpublished dispositions is disfavored except for establishing res judicata, estoppel, or the law of the case and requires service of copies of cited unpublished dispositions of the Fourth Circuit.
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,
Samuel Benjamin KELLY, a/k/a Tiz, Defendant-Appellant.
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,
John Austin EDWARDS, a/k/a Doquan Cooper, a/k/a Shakim,
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,
Jeffrey MAILLARD, a/k/a Spice, Defendant-Appellant.
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,
Camille FORD, Defendant-Appellant.
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,
Anthony MERRICK, a/k/a C, Defendant-Appellant.
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,
Morris Eugene HAYES, a/k/a Easy, Defendant-Appellant.

Nos. 95-5632, 95-5635, 95-5633, 95-5636, 95-5634, 95-5631.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Argued Nov. 1, 1996.
Decided Feb. 26, 1997.

Sa'ad El-Amin, EL-AMIN & CRAWFORD, Richmond, VA; James O. Broccoletti, ZOBY & BROCCOLETTI, Norfolk, VA; Melvin J. Radin, Norfolk, VA, for Appellants.

Laura Pellatiro Tayman, Assistant United States Attorney, Norfolk, VA, for Appellee.

ON BRIEF: Cary B. Bowen, BOWEN & BOWEN, Richmond, VA, for Appellant Hayes; Milton B. Widenhouse, Jr., FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER'S OFFICE, Raleigh, NC, for Appellant Merrick; Kenneth Bruce Willis, Norfolk, VA, for Appellant Maillard. Helen F. Fahey, United States Attorney, Norfolk, VA, for Appellee.

Before HALL and LUTTIG, Circuit Judges, and THORNBURG, United States District Judge for the Western District of North Carolina, sitting by designation.



Between 1989 and 1994, Robert Gillins established and operated a drug trafficking enterprise based principally in New York City with distribution points in various cities in the eastern United States. Gillins' brother-in-law, appellant Samuel Kelly, operated a drug trafficking enterprise in Richmond, Virginia, which merged with Gillins' enterprise in 1993. Appellant Jeffrey Maillard managed Gillins' drug operations in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Gillins, Kelly, and Paul Ebanks (co-organizer for the enterprise's operations in Norfolk, Virginia) recruited associates in New York City to work as distributors, bodyguards, enforcers and couriers for the enterprise's crack cocaine distribution. The record establishes that the enterprise obtained approximately 20 kilograms of cocaine per week, to be cooked into crack cocaine and distributed by the organization in the Tidewater and Richmond areas of Virginia; Philadelphia; Baltimore; Charlotte; and Columbia, South Carolina. J.A. at 894-95. The record also evidences the enterprise's fondness for weaponry and propensity for violence.

On December 2, 1994, a federal grand jury in Norfolk indicted 21 defendants for conspiracy to distribute crack cocaine and cocaine and related offenses. Appellant Samuel Kelly was charged with conspiracy to distribute crack cocaine and cocaine, operating a continuing criminal enterprise, possession with intent to distribute two kilograms of crack cocaine, and conspiracy to commit money laundering. Appellants John Edwards, Jeffrey Maillard, Camille Ford, Anthony Merrick and Morris Eugene Hayes were each charged with conspiracy to distribute crack cocaine and cocaine. Several of the other defendants, including Robert Gillins, pleaded guilty to various offenses and agreed to cooperate with the government.

At the conclusion of the trial, the jury returned a verdict finding Samuel Kelly, John Edwards, Jeffrey Maillard, Camille Ford, Anthony Merrick and Morris Eugene Hayes guilty of conspiracy to distribute crack cocaine and cocaine. Samuel Kelly was also found guilty of operating a continuing criminal enterprise and conspiracy to commit money laundering, but found not guilty of possession with the intent to distribute two kilograms of crack cocaine. Two other defendants, Alfred Cleveland and James Cousins, were found not guilty by the jury.

Appellants raise thirteen arguments challenging their convictions, none of which is meritorious.


During voir dire, prospective juror Samuel Bracey indicated that his son had been prosecuted for conspiracy. Although Bracey stated that he thought that he could decide the case fairly, he also declared that he thought the law of conspiracy was unfair and admitted that he felt hostility toward the court because his son's probation had been revoked. J.A. at 147-49. Judge Smith removed Bracey for cause.

A district court's determination to excuse a juror for cause is entitled to "special deference." Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1038 (1984). The district court conducted a particularized inquiry into Bracey's ability to serve impartially and correctly excused Bracey because of Bracey's stated hostility toward the court in question regarding the very law to be applied in this case.


Appellants argue that government agents' notes from the debriefing of Paul Ebanks constituted Jencks Act "statements" that had to be produced upon request. The Jencks Act defines "statement" in relevant part as "a written statement made by said witness and signed or otherwise adopted or approved by him." 18 U.S.C. § 3500(e)(1). The agents' notes were not transcriptions, nor were they approved by Ebanks. Rather, the agents merely asked follow-up questions for clarification or to ensure that their notes were correct. Ebanks himself testified to that effect: "Like I talk street, and I mean they would have to ask it back to me sometimes, though, to make sure I had the proper--they had the proper language, the proper communication. I might say something in the street, and they wouldn't understand, and they would ask it back to me." J.A. at 371.

The agents' requests for clarification, even when met with confirmation from Ebanks, cannot be classified as adoption or approval of a statement. As this court has recently stated, "a government agent's interview notes that 'merely select[ ] portions, albeit accurately, from a lengthy oral recital' do not satisfy the Jencks Act's requirement of a 'substantially verbatim recital.' " United States v. Roseboro, 87 F.3d 642, 645 (4th Cir.1996), quoting Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343, 352 (1959). Furthermore, even if the notes did constitute a "substantially verbatim recital," they did not become the witness' statement unless the witness read them or the agent read them to him. Id. This requirement is not satisfied where, as here, the agent only read back occasional excerpts for clarification. Therefore, the district court did not err in concluding that the notes were not producible as Jencks Act material.


Appellants also argue that the district court erred in overruling their objections to the prosecution's closing argument rebuttal.

During trial, defense counsel cross-examined government witnesses regarding alleged omissions in their grand jury testimony and debriefing statements and later commented on these alleged omissions during closing arguments. In response, the prosecution stated during rebuttal that "a witness is not impeached if a question was not previously asked." J.A. at 1382. The prosecution continued by urging the jury to "keep in mind that the grand jury presentation of their testimony is a condensed version of the debriefing process, and it is entirely possible, if not probable ... that the question was not asked of the witness when he appeared before the grand jury, or the question was not even asked perhaps when he was debriefed initially." J.A. at 1382-83. Defendants argue that these comments constituted improper opinion and involved matters not in evidence before the jury. However, these responses to the defense attorneys' arguments were appropriate commentary upon the absence of contradictory or inconsistent prior statements by government witnesses.

Defendants also argue that it was improper for the prosecutor to note during closing argument that each of the eight defendants was represented by an attorney, and that if the "client's interests are served by trying to mislead or confuse ... within the limits of the law, that is [the attorney's] job, and that is what he is going to do." J.A. at 1402. Defendants argue that this comment violated due process and punished defendants for exercising their right to counsel. Even assuming that this comment constituted error, such error clearly did not "so prejudice[ ] the trial process as to require reversal." United States v. Harrison, 716 F.2d 1050, 1051 (4th Cir.1983). This court's test for such prejudice consists of four factors:

(1) the degree to which the prosecutor's remarks have a tendency to mislead the jury and to prejudice the accused; (2) whether the remarks were isolated or extensive; (3) absent the remarks, the strength of competent proof introduced to establish the guilt of the accused; and (4) whether the comments were deliberately placed before the jury to divert attention to extraneous matters.

Id. at 1052. Each of these four factors weighs heavily against a finding of prejudice.

Therefore, the district court did not commit reversible error in overruling defendants' objections to the prosecution's closing argument rebuttal.


Appellants object to the district court's admission of evidence regarding: (1) the February 1992 murder of Gregory Woodward; (2) a meeting called by Robert Gillins, in July 1992 in Philadelphia; (3) a meeting of the co-conspirators on New Years Eve of 1992 in New York City; (4) a meeting of the co-conspirators in Spring of 1993 in Baltimore; and (5) evidence that Robert Gillins had threatened Anthony Moore, a government witness. Each of the first four incidents is relevant and probative to establishing the existence of conspiracy between the defendants and others to violate the federal narcotics laws, and to establishing the elements of the continuing criminal enterprise charged in Count Two. The fifth, evidence that Robert Gillins had threatened a government witness, was relevant to the witness' credibility. The admission of the testimony in question certainly did not constitute a "clear abuse of discretion" requiring reversal. United States v. Russell, 971 F.2d 1098, 1104 (4th Cir.1992).


Appellants John Edwards and Jeffrey Maillard argue that the evidence was insufficient to support their convictions for conspiracy to distribute narcotics. Under United States v. Brooks, 957 F.2d 1138 (4th Cir.1992):

Once it has been shown that a conspiracy exists, the evidence need only establish a slight connection between the defendant and the conspiracy to support conviction. A defendant need not have knowledge of his coconspirators, or knowledge of the details of the conspiracy. And a defendant may be convicted despite having played a minor role in the overall conspiracy.

Id. at 1147. Coupled with this broad definition of conspiracy is the very deferential standard of review for sufficiency of the evidence claims. The question on appeal is "whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, any rational trier of facts could have found the defendant[s] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." United States v. Tresvant, 677 F.2d 1018, 1021 (4th Cir.1982). This standard is easily met with regard to both Edwards and Maillard.

The abundant evidence against the two men need not be recited in full. Representative of the evidence against Edwards is that Ebanks testified that Ivan Gibson asked Edwards "if he could sell some drugs down there [in Ohio], and [Edwards] said it was okay, there was no problem." J.A. at 188. Similarly, representative of the evidence against Maillard is the testimony that Maillard provided false identification documents for Paul Ebanks, Robert Gillins, and Pete Johnson, J.A. at 592-93, and the testimony that William Lisby and Terrance James delivered kilogram quantities of crack cocaine to Maillard for the Philadelphia operation, J.A. at 682-84, 880.


Appellants offer a bevy of additional arguments, none of which is meritorious.

Appellants argue that the district court effectively directed a verdict against them by telling the jury that the defendants should be found guilty of conspiracy if they sold drugs for profit. This argument fails because the court actually responded to the jury's question regarding whether a buyer is part of a conspiracy if he sells drugs for profit by telling the jury that such a buyer is part of a conspiracy "provided the elements of instruction 20 are met." J.A. at 1432. Therefore, the district court did not, as appellants argue, tell the jury that selling drugs for profit is sufficient for a conspiracy conviction.

Appellant Ford challenges the amount of drugs which the district court attributed to her. However, it was not clearly erroneous for the district court to conclude, "based upon the trial testimony, [the district court's] review of [its] notes, and in particular Mr. Lisby and Mr. Wilmot's testimony, as bolstered by the other witnesses," that Ms. Ford was responsible for 31 kilograms of powder cocaine. J.A. at 1505-06.

Appellants also argue that the 100 to 1 sentencing ratio of cocaine base to cocaine powder violates the Equal Protection Clause because it has a disproportionate impact on the black population. We have explicitly held, however, that this alleged disparity does not violate the Equal Protection Clause. United States v. Wallace, 22 F.3d 84, 88 (4th Cir.1994).

Appellant Anthony Merrick contends that his three prior convictions from New York should be counted as only one offense because they "were consolidated for trial or sentencing." U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2, appl. note 3. However, Merrick's prior cases were heard on the same date only because of a "backlog in New York." J.A. at 1458. The district court noted that the prior offenses resulted in separate convictions and separate sentences and that no order of consolidation had been entered. J.A. at 1460-61. The mere fact that the cases were heard on the same day does not constitute consolidation.

Appellant Merrick also argues that the district court erred in not granting him a two point reduction for being only a minor participant in the conspiracy. Merrick argues that he was a "mere courier." However, the district court noted that Merrick "is personally responsible for 194.06 kilograms of crack cocaine, was a bodyguard carrying a firearm for the major distributor for the organization in Richmond, and furthermore, operated in this conspiracy from August of 1990 through February of 1991, and May of 1993 through January of 1994." J.A. at 1448. The district court's conclusion was not clearly erroneous.

Finally, appellant Samuel Kelly argues that his simultaneous criminal prosecution and forfeiture constitutes double jeopardy. However, review of claims of double jeopardy in a single proceeding "is limited to ensuring that the total punishment did not exceed that authorized by the legislature." United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 450 (1989). Kelly presents no evidence that his punishment exceeded that authorized by Congress.


For the reasons stated herein, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.

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Last edited by joeblow; 02-06-2011 at 02:34 PM.
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Old 05-06-2011, 10:42 AM   #4
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Default And so what?

Ironsore/Ebanks has spoken freely about elements of his past. Why do you not mention the drug-trafficking of the CIA or the fact that American corporations engage in money-laundering and human sex slaves?

This is a common reaction to truth seekers. What some of these shills represent is the elite's will for the common man to accept the version of conspiracy thought that has been whitewashed by the criminals themselves.

And if Ebanks has been in trouble with the law, it has no effect on his message. It is the tactic of cowards to cry "anti-Semite" because all things point to a cabal who happen to be predominantly Jewish. But they are of the Kahzarian race, the descendants of converts. What Ebanks has said about Joe Blow is plausible. With that kind of exposure, it is clear to see why you are desperately airing his dirty laundry.

The idiotic music that accompanies looking at your site is but one indication that you are FOS and what Ironshore has said about you is correct.

Last edited by donnydark; 05-06-2011 at 10:44 AM.
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