U.S. refusal to prolong START-1 fatal mistake [Archive]

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december

02-08-2007, 04:21 PM

U.S. refusal to prolong START-1 fatal mistake - Russian experts

02/ 08/ 2007

http://img.rian.ru/images/7018/16/70181629.jpg

MOSCOW, August 2 (RIA Novosti) - A decision not to renew a major nuclear arms reduction treaty may have dire consequences for U.S. foreign policy and the entire world, Russian experts said Thursday.

The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START-1) was signed by the United States and the Soviet Union on July 31, 1991, five months before the union collapsed, and remains in force between the U.S., Russia, and three other ex-Soviet states.

Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine have since disposed of all their nuclear weapons or transferred them to Russia, and the U.S. and Russia have reduced the number of delivery vehicles to 1,600, with no more than 6,000 warheads. The treaty is set to expire on December 5, 2009.

General James E. Cartwright, commander of the U.S. Strategic Command, said Wednesday that the refusal to prolong the START-1 Treaty would allow the United States to conduct quick and pinpointed strikes anywhere in the world, which is crucial for an effective fight against global terrorism.

"With such statements, the U.S. officials continue to promote their policy of forced global leadership," Sergei Markov, the head of the Institute of Political Research, a Kremlin-connected Moscow think tank, told RIA Novosti.

"All that we see today is that a global superpower is essentially ruled by extremists who commit catastrophic mistakes throwing the world into risky ventures," Markov said, adding that in the U.S. this group of radical extremists is represented by the so-called Neoconservatives, led by Vice President Dick Cheney.

Alexander Khramchikhin, an expert at the Institute of Political and Military Analysis, said the new initiatives proposed by the U.S. military were a logical continuation of the policies conducted by the current Washington administration.

"Frankly, it is a consistent U.S. policy [at present] to abandon all treaties that bind them by obligation to anyone," the expert said.

"It is difficult to predict the future of the START-1 treaty. The U.S. administration will probably be reshuffled soon," he said, adding that if a Democratic candidate became president the U.S. would "not continue destroying all [international] treaties."

Sergei Markov also agreed that changes in the future U.S. administration after the 2008 presidential election would dramatically transform U.S. foreign policy.

"It is clear today that the American people will reject the current policy and this group [of radical Neoconservatives] will retreat, 'licking their wounds,' to think tanks and newspaper and magazine offices," the expert said.

http://en.rian.ru/russia/20070802/70197039.html

december

03-08-2007, 07:08 PM

The MAD situation is no longer there

29/ 05/ 2007

MOSCOW. (Alexander Khramchikhin for RIA Novosti) - On May 26, 1972, U.S. President Richard Nixon and Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev signed the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty, or SALT, the first bilateral agreement of its kind.

It included an interim agreement on certain measures with respect to the limitation of strategic offensive arms. The two leaders also signed the ABM Treaty. The former treaty sealed the alignment of forces in ground-based and sea-launched ballistic missiles, while in the latter the sides voluntarily renounced development of defense against these missiles.

http://www.state.gov/cms_images/6brezhnev_nixon1_600.jpg

In a way, SALT-1 was brought into being by the Vietnam War. Before it, the United States had an overwhelming albeit decreasing superiority over the Soviet Union in strategic nuclear weapons. But the adventure in South-East Asia depleted America of its strength. The Pentagon budget was blown out of all proportion. The bulk of the money went into conventional arms. They were sent to Vietnam and quickly perished in anti-Vietcong battles (the U.S. lost 8,600 aircraft and helicopters in eight and a half years).

The Soviet investment into Vietcong paled into insignificance when compared to what the United States was spending on its troops in Vietnam and its Vietnamese allies. But nonetheless Moscow inflicted a heavy defeat on Washington. At the same time, the Soviet Union made a breakthrough in strategic nuclear arms and caught up with America, which had to neglect them because of heavy Vietnamese spending. This country successfully tested its first anti-ballistic missile in 1961 - 23 years before America did.

When SALT-1 was signed, the United States was still fighting in Vietnam. The war was escalating domestic tensions. America could not afford to restore its strategic arms superiority. This is why despite resistance from the conservatives and some MIC (military-industrial complex) representatives, the U.S. leadership decided it was good enough to seal the parity.

Renunciation of nationwide ABM systems (two ABM-protected regions were allowed, and later reduced to one) was more important than offensive arms limitations. Lack of self-defense was supposed to curb a desire to attack - this was a situation of mutual assured destruction (MAD). The ABM Treaty had a pragmatic side. Developing effective anti-ballistic weapons was much more difficult and expensive than missiles. Besides, each side could break through enemy ABM at a much smaller cost. Thus, the treaty provided an excuse to renounce exorbitant spending with very dubious results. The United States did not even go for the allowed ABM area unlike the Soviet Union, which protected Moscow against a ballistic missile attack.

During the past 35 years, the sides signed SALT-2, START-1, START-2, and finally the Strategic Potentials Treaty. For brevity's sake, they cannot be described in a short article.

Eventually, the United States walked out on the ABM Treaty when it no longer suited it.

Today, the United States is again waging a war that is likely to cost it more than the Vietnam War both financially and politically. The Pentagon budget has reached skyrocketing heights once again. As before, there is no time or money for strategic arms, but America is developing a militarily bizarre ABM system.

As during the Vietnam War, Russia can exploit America's problems but has not done this so far. The U.S. strategic nuclear force has remained unchanged for the past 15 years with a few insignificant exceptions (withdrawal of MX missiles and a portion of B-52 bombers, and replacement of ballistic weapons with cruise missiles on four Ohio nuclear submarines). Russia is reducing its strategic nuclear weapons quickly. Interestingly, in the moneyless 1990s Moscow managed to maintain its strategic nuclear potential almost at the same level as it was immediately after the Soviet Union's disintegration; in the 21st century strategic arms are rapidly dwindling even despite a sharp growth in defense expenditures.

Unlike the United States, which has not acquired new strategic carriers for a long time, Russia has been building its mobile, and since the late 1990s, silo-based Topol ICBMs. However, the problem is that the Topol missile has only one warhead, whereas the old Soviet models carried from six to 10 warheads, but they are now being decommissioned as their service life expires. This means that the number of warheads on sea- and ground-based missiles has been halved in 2000-2007. Russia is trying to upgrade the sea leg of its strategic nuclear arsenal, but the new Bulava SLBM has not passed a single successful test.

Substantial cuts in offensive arms are creating an entirely new military-strategic situation not only in Russian-U.S. relations but also in the world as a whole.

First, with fewer strategic carriers and warheads, the ABM system may prove effective. The current ABM systems - either Russian, or even less so, the half-virtual American - are incapable of parrying a massive nuclear strike. In fact, there is no sense in trying to do this. But a tangible reduction in the number of potential targets may prompt some people to think that the game is worth the candle. One can invest in the development of a really effective ABM system and first-strike weapons, for example, in conventional high-accuracy systems. The final goal is to create a capability for a disarming first strike (nuclear, non-nuclear or mixed) at the enemy's strategic nuclear potential. ABM will finish off whatever survives the first blow.

To sum up, reduction of offensive arms, lack of restrictions on defensive weapons and rapid development of non-nuclear high accuracy systems may destabilize the world situation.

Second, 35 years ago, either the Soviet or the American potential were many times bigger than the British, French and Chinese nuclear arsenals put together. Now the situation has changed. More countries have nuclear weapons, whereas both Russia and the United States now have fewer carriers and warheads than before. Moreover, only these two countries are bound by a treaty on medium and shorter-range missiles. This makes further bilateral treaties pointless.

Any new nuclear arms reduction agreements should cover all nuclear countries, including unofficial members of the club (Israel, India, Pakistan and North Korea). This is a much bigger problem for Russia than for the United States. All other nuclear countries are in Eurasia and the bulk of nuclear weapons are targeted at Russia. China, for instance, has a few ICBMs that can reach America, but many more medium-range missiles that are aimed at Russia and India (maybe, this is how the Moscow-Delhi-Beijing triangle manifests itself).

Today, mutual security requires an entirely new approach but nobody is likely to adopt it. Moreover, the bad situation is getting worse. Having become the world's only leader in the early 1990s, the United States has uprooted a system of international law, thereby inflicting heavy damage on itself. We are watching the demise of the unipolar world. It is not becoming multipolar and is only breeding chaos.

Russia does not have a clear-cut foreign policy concept and is clinging to the old Soviet line in a completely different geopolitical situation. None of the other countries are ready to play first fiddle in world affairs. Under the circumstances, many countries may be tempted to take part in the new race for nuclear missiles and other weapons.

Alexander Khramchikhin heads the analytical department at the Institute of Political and Military Analysis.

http://en.rian.ru/analysis/20070529/66285617.html

december

04-08-2007, 01:08 AM

Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty I

Summary

The negotiations known as Strategic Arms Limitation Talks began in November 1969 and ended in January 1972, with agreement on two documents: the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM Treaty) and the Interim Agreement on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. Both were signed on May 26, 1972.

Interim Agreement between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. of five-year duration which froze the number of strategic ballistic missiles at 1972 levels. Construction of additional land-based ICBM silos were prohibited, while SLBM launcher levels can be increased if corresponding reductions are made in older ICBM or SLBM launchers. Modernization of launchers is allowed, however, if kept within specific dimensions.

Narrative
SALT I, the first series of Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, extended from November 1969 to May 1972. During that period the United States and the Soviet Union negotiated the first agreements to place limits and restraints on some of their central and most important armaments. In a Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, they moved to end an emerging competition in defensive systems that threatened to spur offensive competition to still greater heights. In an Interim Agreement on Certain Measures With Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, the two nations took the first steps to check the rivalry in their most powerful land- and submarine-based offensive nuclear weapons.

Soviet and American weapons systems were far from symmetrical. The Soviet Union had continued its development and deployment of heavy ballistic missiles and had overtaken the U.S. lead in land-based ICBMs. During the SALT I years alone Soviet ICBMs rose from around 1,000 to around 1,500, and they were being deployed at the rate of some 200 annually. Soviet submarine-based launchers had quadrupled. The huge payload capacity of some Soviet missiles ("throw-weight") was seen as a possible threat to U.S. land-based strategic missiles even in heavily protected ("hardened") launch-sites.

The United States had not increased its deployment of strategic missiles since 1967 (when its ICBMs numbered 1,054 and its SLBMs 656), but it was conducting a vigorous program of equipping missiles with "Multiple Independently-targeted Re-entry Vehicles" (MIRV). "MIRVs" permit an individual missile to carry a number of warheads directed at separate targets. MIRVs thus gave the United States a lead in numbers of warheads. The United States also retained a lead in long-range bombers. The Soviet Union had a limited ABM system around Moscow; the United States had shifted from its earlier plan for a "thin" ABM defense of certain American cities and instead began to deploy ABMs at two land-based ICBM missile sites to protect its retaliatory forces. (The full program envisaged 12 ABM complexes.)

Besides these asymmetries in their strategic forces, the defense needs and commitments of the two parties differed materially. The United States had obligations for the defense of allies overseas, such as Western Europe and Japan, while the Soviet Unions allies were its near neighbors. All these circumstances made for difficulties in equating specific weapons, or categories of weapons, and in defining overall strategic equivalence.

In a summit meeting in Moscow, after two and a half years of negotiation, the first round of SALT was brought to a conclusion on May 26, 1972, when President Nixon and General Secretary Brezhnev signed the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement on strategic offensive arms.

Intensive research had gone into finding ways of verifying possible agreements without requiring access to the territory of the other side. Both the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement stipulate that compliance is to be assured by "national technical means of verification." Moreover, the agreements include provisions that are important steps to strengthen assurance against violations: both sides undertake not to interfere with national technical means of verification. In addition, both countries agree not to use deliberate concealment measures to impede verification.

http://www.atomicarchive.com/Treaties/Treaty8.shtml

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/d/d6/Carter_Brezhnev_sign_SALT_II.jpg/350px-Carter_Brezhnev_sign_SALT_II.jpg

december

04-08-2007, 01:55 AM

Well, if there will be an exchange of nuclear strikes between Russia and US then at least you will know what party WALKED AWAY from the international agreements.

Good luck to us all....

http://www.newguards.us/Lib/Impeachment/ALLSCREWED.jpg

Nuclear War - YouTube

king

04-08-2007, 07:58 AM

december

04-08-2007, 03:21 PM

U.S. missile defense: the facts of life

02/ 03/ 2007

On December 13, 2001, George W. Bush declared that the United States would unilaterally withdraw from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, and a year later he ordered the deployment of an anti-missile defense system.

The reaction of top-level officials in Russia was low-key. Some voiced "regret," and Yury Baluyevsky, then first deputy chief of the General Staff of Russia, said that steps by the United States to put a global anti-missile shield in place by 2010-2015, or perhaps even 2020, "posed no threat to Russia's security."

Indeed, the next 10 to 15 years are going to be a political rather than a military headache for Russia. The technology to develop an effective intercept network, especially against individually targetable warheads, does not currently exist. The only unpleasant note for Russia will be its greater exposure to the system's components, which will be located in Poland and the Czech Republic.

The trajectory of an intercontinental ballistic missile can be divided into four phases.

The first is the boost phase: from launch to engine burnout and jettisoning at an altitude of 200 to 300 kilometers. In the case of solid-propellant missiles, this phase may last up to three minutes, and with liquid-propellant ones up to five. The remaining missile bus contains nuclear warheads, a control system, vernier engines and devices to help the missile penetrate enemy defenses, called "penetration aids." The latter include heavy and light decoys identical in temperature, effective scatter area and flight velocity to live re-entry vehicles, and hundreds of thousands of chaff pieces to confuse an enemy radar.

In the second phase, when instructed by the control system, the bus maneuvers into the first pre-calculated position and fires a warhead and some of the penetration aids against target No. 1. Then it moves into the second pre-calculated position, then the third, and so on, depending on the number of nuclear warheads carried. Each maneuver takes 30 to 40 seconds.

The third phase is the ballistic coasting of all elements released - real and dummy - at altitudes of up to 1,200 kilometers. This phase lasts 15 to 20 minutes.

The final and shortest phase is less than a minute long, with "clouds" of elements entering the atmosphere at an altitude of 110-120 kilometers and at speeds of around 7 km/sec. Air drag causes the dummy elements to fall behind heavier combat units. Nevertheless, identifying a warhead surrounded by a bevy of decoys is incredibly difficult in engineering terms and is unlikely to be achieved in the near future. So no anti-missile system will be effective unless it can destroy missiles in the first, or boost, phase, which affords the best conditions for pinpointing (from the infrared glow of their burning engines) and targeting interceptors.

The destruction of missiles is made easier by their large size and relatively low mechanical sturdiness. But interception at this phase is possible only if a ground-based interceptor is faster than the attacking missile and not more than 500 kilometers away, in the case of liquid-fueled ballistic missiles, or 300 kilometers in the case of solid-propellant missiles. The Americans themselves concede that missiles launched from Russia's hinterland would be impossible to intercept, which explains their desire to move anti-missiles closer to the Russian border.

The success of a counter-strike also depends on the sophistication of an intelligence-gathering system, whose objective is to fix the moment of launch, second-guess the flight path and guide an interceptor to its target. The earlier the launch is detected, the better the chances of a successful hit.

Well before pulling out of the 1972 ABM Treaty, the United States took concrete steps to deploy, along the Russian border, radars capable of spotting missile launches and sending targeting data to interceptors. The first such radar, code-named HAVE STARE, was stationed in Norway. If the radars scheduled to be positioned in the Czech Republic have roughly the same characteristics as the HAVE STARE, they will cover practically all of European Russia, which extends as far as the Urals.

Experts from an authoritative organization, the American Physical Society, have reached some very interesting conclusions. These are contained in a report issued by its working group and dealing with intercept systems for national missile defense. The authors of the paper draw attention to the fact that a successful intercept in the boost phase will prevent a strike against planned targets, but the surviving warheads will fall on populated areas along the flight trajectory and inflict a heavy death toll.

So in the event of a nuclear conflict, the first strike will hit countries which host elements of an American missile defense system. The experts note that the remaining submunitions will under no circumstances fall on the territory of a launching country. Their calculations show that if a missile is hit when traveling at a speed of 3.9 km/sec, its warheads may travel for another 2,000 kilometers, and at 5.5 km/sec, they will go a further 5,000 kilometers.

What counter-measures can be taken to reduce, if not neutralize, the effectiveness of a future American missile interception system?

Shortening the boost phase is considered to be the most radical way of countering interception. That can be achieved by converting liquid-fueled missiles to solid-propellant ones. Future plans envision cutting the boost phase to one minute and ending it at an altitude of 80 to 100 kilometers.

A missile's maneuvering in the track-out phase will also make interception more difficult. Yury Solomonov, who designed Russia's newest missile, the Topol-M, said that it can maneuver both in the vertical and horizontal plane, which has been demonstrated in tests. Another trick is to use a depressed trajectory that practically never rises above the dense layers of the atmosphere.

On balance, while recognizing that the United States' withdrawal from the ABM Treaty was a mistake - one which, however, does not threaten Russian security - it is still necessary to closely monitor developments in the U.S. in this field and work out methods of disabling its anti-missile systems.

Another point to bear in mind is that with cuts in strategic offensive weapons, the role of missile defense will grow considerably because its combat effectiveness is inversely proportional to the number of attacking missiles and warheads. So maintaining a sufficient potential for nuclear deterrence over the next decades is one of Russia's key military and political goals.

Yury Zaitsev is an expert at the Russian Academy of Engineering Sciences.

http://en.rian.ru/analysis/20070302/61469215.html

http://www.globalsecurity.org/space/world/russia/images/pusk-mbr-topol-m-plesetsk.jpg

december

05-08-2007, 10:50 PM

Russia to launch serial production of Bulava ballistic missile

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05/ 08/ 2007

SEVASTOPOL, August 5 (RIA Novosti) - Russia has made a decision to start serial production of its new Bulava-M sea-launched ballistic missile, following a successful test launch in late June, the Russian Navy commander said Sunday.

The scheduled launch was conducted June 28 from the submerged Dmitry Donskoi, a Typhoon-class ballistic missile nuclear submarine, in the northern Russia's White Sea, and the missile reached its target at the Kura testing grounds on the Kamchatka Peninsula, about 6,700 kilometers (4,200 miles) east of Moscow.

Admiral Vladimir Masorin said the latest test launch was important to make a decision on the ballistic missile production, adding that the concluding test launches would be made from the Yuri Dolgoruky fourth-generation strategic nuclear submarine.

The national defense program envisions the deployment of the Bulava on nuclear submarines. The missiles are expected to become the mainstay of the Russian Navy's strategic nuclear forces in decades to come.

Masorin said Russia would hold two more test launches of the Bulava missile in 2007 and would complete tests in 2008.

"We have no doubts that the Bulava-M missile system will be tested successfully. Huge intellectual labor and financial resources have been invested in the creation of this system," Masorin said.

http://en.rian.ru/russia/20070805/70378998.html

december

06-08-2007, 03:23 PM

So, how come nobody said in this thread that Putin is an Illuminati too and this is their plan?

december

06-08-2007, 07:28 PM

Russia to equip two air regiments with Su-34 strike planes soon

02/ 08/ 2007

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MOSCOW, August 2 (RIA Novosti) - Two regiments of the 16th Air Army will be equipped with new Su-34 Fullback fighter-bombers in the near future, the army commander said Thursday.

Designed by the Sukhoi Design Bureau, the Su-34s will replace the Su-24 Fencer frontline bombers. Experts said the new bomber has the potential to become the best plane in its class for years to come.

"The schedule for re-equipment of air regiments [in the Russian Air Force] with new and modernized aircraft has been determined," Major General Alexander Belevitch said. "Two of our air regiments will be re-armed soon."

The $36 million Su-34 fighter-bomber is a two-seat strike aircraft equipped with twin AL-31MF afterburning turbojet engines. It is designed to deliver high-precision strikes on heavily-defended targets under any weather conditions, day or night, and fields weaponry that includes a 30mm GSh-301 cannon, up to 12 Alamo or Archer AAMs, ASMs, and bombs.

The first serial-production Su-34 has been procured by the Defense Ministry and will soon be deployed at the Lipetsk pilot training center for practical training of military pilots.

General Belevitch said the 16th Air Army would also receive MiG-29SM Fulcrum fighters to replace outdated MiG-29s and modernized Su-25 Frogfoot close support aircraft, which showed outstanding performance during operations in Afghanistan, Chechnya and other "hot spots."

The 16th Air Army, headquartered at Kubinka, is essentially a tactical air force component of the Moscow Military District, with zone of responsibility of up to 1.3 million square kilometers, including the country's capital, Moscow.

http://en.rian.ru/russia/20070802/70212524.html

december

28-08-2007, 08:27 PM

U.S. Senator Lugar speaks for extending START-I Treaty

28/ 08/ 2007

http://img.rian.ru/images/7530/24/75302498.jpg

MOSCOW, August 28 (RIA Novosti) - Russia and the U.S. should extend the START-I Treaty, which expires in 2009, or else negative consequences will result, U.S. senator Richard Lugar said Tuesday.

"The United States and Russia must extend the START Treaty's verification and transparency elements, which will expire in 2009," Lugar told an arms control round table in Moscow.

Lugar said the two countries should also introduce additional verification elements for the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) treaty.

The START-I Treaty was signed July 31, 1991 and expires December 5, 2009.

It remains in force as a treaty between the U.S., Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine. Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine have since totally disarmed their strategic arms capabilities, and the U.S. and Russia reduced the number of delivery vehicles to 1,600, with no more than 6,000 warheads each.

The treaty was followed by START-II, which banned the use of multiple re-entry vehicles (MIRV) but never entered into force and was later bypassed by the SORT Treaty, signed by Vladimir Putin and George W. Bush in Moscow May 24, 2002, also known as "the Moscow Treaty."

Lugar also told the round table that Russia and the U.S. could in the future give up chemical, biological and nuclear weapons.

The round table is dedicated to the 15th anniversary of the Nunn-Lugar program, a cooperation program developed by Lugar and then-Senator Sam Nunn in 1991, the year when the U.S.S.R. collapsed, to render assistance to Russia and other former Soviet republics in securing and destroying weapons of mass destruction.

A Russian representative, retired Colonel General Yevgeny Maslov, a former high-ranking Defense Ministry official, said nuclear weapons are bait for international terrorists.

"Disarmament is continuing, the Cold War is behind, and we still count arsenals by the thousands," he said.

Lugar also said the Nunn-Lugar program could be used to deal with the North Korean nuclear problem, and could be extended to other countries.

Speaking about would-be plans to deploy Russian military facilities in Belarus, including nuclear weapons, Lugar said that would be counterproductive for bilateral relations.

Earlier, media cited Russia's Ambassador to Belarus, Alexander Surikov, as saying that Russia could deploy certain military facilities in Belarus.

The U.S. announced plans in January to deploy interceptor missiles in Poland and a missile defense radar in the Czech Republic as part of its missile shield aimed at countering possible threats from "rogue states" such as Iran and North Korea, which Russia has said would threaten its national security.

http://en.rian.ru/world/20070828/75416225.html

wanderer

28-08-2007, 09:57 PM

Russia and the USA are two sides of the same coin, despite what we see and hear on the TV and in the press.

Do you think the delusional high-ups will really destroy the matrix? The matrix they have worked so hard to create and control.

The game commences.

Peace.

december

28-08-2007, 10:14 PM

Russia and the USA are two sides of the same coin...

Can you prove it?

december

30-08-2007, 10:02 PM

Russian-U.S. talks on START-I to be held in Rome in Sept.

30/ 08/ 2007

TOKYO, August 30 (RIA Novosti) - Russian-U.S. talks on a replacement for the START-I arms reduction treaty will be held in early September in Rome, a high-ranking Russian Foreign Ministry disarmament official said Thursday.

"It's difficult to say yet what it will deliver. Talks are ongoing. We would like this to be a legally binding agreement which demonstrates our countries' commitment to nuclear disarmament, strengthening the predictability in our relationship and to reflect all the best and most efficient things that are in the current START treaty," Anatoly Antonov said on a visit to Japan.

The START-I Treaty was signed July 31, 1991 and expires December 5, 2009.

It remains in force as a treaty between the U.S., Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine. Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine have since totally disarmed their strategic arms capabilities, and the U.S. and Russia has reduced the number of delivery vehicles to about 1,600, with no more than 6,000 warheads each.

"The United States and Russia must extend the START Treaty's verification and transparency elements, which will expire in 2009," Lugar told an arms control round table in Moscow.

Lugar said the two countries should also introduce additional verification elements for the SORT treaty.

READ MORE -

http://en.rian.ru/world/20070830/75785671.html

President Putin inspects Topol-M mobile ICBMs

http://img.rian.ru/images/5696/26/56962607.jpg

Land-based mobile strategic missile system Topol-M getting into position trategic missile division in the town of Teikovo, Ivanovo Region

http://img.rian.ru/images/5696/24/56962498.jpg

Sergei Ivanov, Deputy Prime Minister and Defense Minister, and Russian President Vladimir Putin (left to right) inspecting mobile Topol-M intercontinental ballistic missile systems while on a visit to a division of the Strategic Missile Forces deployed in Teikovo, Ivanovo Region.

december

30-08-2007, 10:51 PM

You'd better wake up, people!!!

U.S. refusal to prolong START-1 fatal mistake...

december

31-08-2007, 12:06 AM

Why would America REFUSE to prolong this agreement?...

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jYUuTlqTmjM

http://www.newguards.us/Lib/Impeachment/ALLSCREWED.jpg

synergy777

31-08-2007, 01:00 AM

december you are in chicago, you will be fucked when the martial law comes into effect. you might get sent away to a fema camp, for being a russian terrorist?

december

01-09-2007, 01:08 AM

Future of Gabala radar to be discussed in September

29/ 08/ 2007

http://img.rian.ru/images/6917/01/69170164.jpg

MOSCOW. (Rauf Radzhabov for RIA Novosti) - Azerbaijan, the United States and Russia will meet in Baku in early September for consultations on the joint use of the Gabala radar.

On June 7, during the G8 summit in Germany, Russian President Vladimir Putin invited the United States to share the early warning radar in Gabala, Azerbaijan, if it abandons its plans to deploy elements of its anti-ballistic missile system in Europe.

Although President George W. Bush said Putin's proposal was logical, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice insisted that Washington would not abandon its ABM plans for Europe.

Subsequent events exposed the two countries' true intentions.

Some state officials and experts, including some in Russia, do not view Iranian missiles as a threat - but they may be wrong.

This summer, Iran and North Korea signed an agreement under which Iran will receive several dozen Taep'o-dong 2 missiles, with an effective range of up to 4,000 km (2,486 miles), by the end of the year.

Iran currently has no missiles that can reach Europe, but the North Korean missiles could easily fly from Iran to Germany, France, Britain and other countries in Europe. No wonder these countries (with the exception of Austria) support United States' ABM plans.

There are also reasons to assume that North Korea will supply Iran with ballistic missiles with a range of 11,000 km (6,837 miles), which it is currently developing, by 2013. Armed with these missiles, the unstable Iranian regime would be able to launch a missile attack against the United States. Only the ABM systems Washington plans to deploy in Poland and the Czech Republic by 2013 would be able to stop the attack.

The Iranian president is assuring the world of his country's peaceful intentions only in order to buy time to create nuclear weapons.

The United States and Russia are aware of the Iranian threat. Of the four contemporary evils - nuclear blackmail, international terrorism, ethnic separatism and religious extremism - Washington and Moscow especially fear the threat of local nuclear wars and international terrorism. This is why they need ABM systems, and it is from this perspective that we should consider both the events of the past two years and those to come in the future.

The Kremlin's asymmetrical response to the deployment of the American ABM system in Europe includes the creation of the GLONASS system and the construction of the new Voronezh-type radars.

Russia is establishing a global positioning system in orbit, and not only for peaceful purposes. Military satellites can create continuous navigation space, which allows establishing the precise coordinates of any object on the ground, on the sea or in the air. Precision weapons cannot be used without satellite navigation systems.

The Russian GLONASS system comprises 24 satellites, and should be in place by the end of 2009. As of now, Russia has 18 satellites in orbit, which is insufficient to cover the whole planet.

A recent statement by a Russian official about Moscow's intention to stop using the Gabala radar before 2012 has created a sensation.

Under a 2002 arrangement between Baku and Moscow, Russia pays Azerbaijan $7 million a year for the use of Gabala. The agreement ends in 2012, but in 2006 Baku asked to double the fee to $14 million. Recently First Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov publicly pronounced the Gabala radar outdated and promised that Russia would replace it with a much smaller and cheaper solution in 2007.

Moscow may stop using the Gabala radar, but this is not the point. The Gabala radar is an early warning system, and not the X-range radar used to guide the Ground-Based Interceptor (GBI) missiles, which the United States plans to deploy in the Czech Republic as an element of missile defense.

One huge drawback of the Gabala radar is that it is located too close to possible launch sites in Iran and other unstable countries in the region.

Religious extremists are openly fighting for power in Islamabad, and Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf no longer controls his country. Pakistan has nuclear weapons, and I shudder to think who would take them over when Musharraf leaves.

The Gabala radar was built to track missiles' takeoff and the powered flight phase. But it does not "see" the interim phase, as it looks out to the south, not the north. The American GBI missiles are designed to intercept exoatmospheric targets.

The Kremlin, which is aware of this, will be able to stop using the Gabala radar when it builds a Voronezh radar near Armavir in the Krasnodar Territory (southern Russia).

The Voronezh radars could serve as part of a missile and air defense system, keeping an eye on a vast area extending from the North Pole to North Africa. The first radar of this type was put on combat duty in the village of Lekhtusi in the Leningrad Region in December 2006. It is a new-generation radar superior to its foreign analogues. It is a modular "high readiness" facility, which does not require extensive preparation of the deployment site.

The Voronezh radar should replace the old Dnepr and Daryal systems. Apart from the Armavir site, three more Voronezh radars will be built in Russia's eastern and northern regions. Each radar unit costs about 2 billion rubles (almost $78 million) - ten times cheaper than the Daryal-type Gabala radar.

The United States is present in Azerbaijan, even though it is not using the Gabala radar. Several years ago, it deployed its TRML-3D mobile surveillance and target acquisition radars, which can be integrated efficiently into air defense command and control systems, near the towns of Khyzy and Astara. They are monitoring an area of 300 km (186 miles) across the border with Iran.

I believe that the forthcoming tripartite talks in Baku should discuss not only the joint use of Gabala, but also possible measures to counter the Iranian nuclear threat and the dangerous plans of international terrorists and religious extremists.

Rauf Radzhabov is a military expert from Azerbaijan and editor-in-chief of the 3rd View information and analysis agency.

http://en.rian.ru/analysis/20070829/75662730.html

smoking oceanus

01-09-2007, 01:16 AM

Er. you'll likely disagree with this December but anyways, according to some sources (like Swerdlow, you might not like him) there is Illuminati infighting going on between some families.

The Romanov bloodline are pretty much in leftfield and are at total odds with the rest of the other bloodlines.

december

01-09-2007, 01:30 AM

The Romanov bloodline are pretty much in leftfield and are at total odds with the rest of the other bloodlines.

In case you didn't know - the Romanovs had been killed in 1918.

After the February Revolution, Nicholas II and his family were placed under house arrest. Several members of royal family, including Grand Duke Cyril Vladimirovich of Russia, managed to establish good relations with the interim government and eventually fled the country during the October Revolution.

On July 17, 1918, Bolshevik authorities, led by Yakov Yurovsky, shot Nicholas II, his immediate family, and four servant members in the cellar of the Ipatiev House in Ekaterinburg, Russia. The family was told that they would be photographed to prove to the people that they were still alive. The family was arranged appropriately and left alone for several minutes. Soon the very people that were protecting them entered and shot them. At first the girls did not die because of the jewels sewn into their corsets. These jewels were for protection but also so that the family could have some money for when they fled the country.

House of Romanov - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

december

01-09-2007, 03:18 PM

Russia to continue advanced missile tests in 2007 - SMF commander

01/ 09/ 2007

http://img.rian.ru/images/5693/85/56938529.jpg

MOSCOW, September 1 (RIA Novosti) - Russia's Strategic Missile Forces will conduct more tests of new warheads for its intercontinental ballistic missiles later this year, the SMF commander said Saturday.

"This year we will continue test and combat-training launches of new types of warheads for the Topol-M and Bulava sea-launched missile complexes," Col. Gen. Nikolai Solovtsov said.

He said previously a second missile battalion, equipped with advanced Topol-M (SS-27) road-mobile ICBMs, will be put on combat duty before the end of the year and that the deployment of silo-based Topol-M systems in the Saratov Region and road-mobile systems in the Ivanovo Region (central Russia) would be completed in 2010.

As of December 2006, the Strategic Missile Forces operated 44 silo-based and three mobile missile systems.

The commander said the Topol-M system will be equipped with multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRV) in the next two or three years, adding that the new system would help penetrate missile defenses more effectively.

His statement came against the backdrop of growing tensions between Moscow and the West regarding plans by the United States to deploy elements of its global antiballistic missile defense system in Central Europe.

Gen. Solovtsov said the Strategic Missile Forces would factor in the new threats.

"If the U.S. proceeds with missile defense plans, despite serious opposition from people in Europe, the Strategic Missile Forces will manage to take adequate measures to counter threats to Russia," he said.

The national defense program envisions the deployment of Bulava-M sea-launched ballistic missiles on nuclear submarines. The missiles are expected to become the mainstay of the Russian Navy's strategic nuclear forces in decades to come.

The Russian Armed Forces commissioned more than 30 new types of advanced weapon systems in the first half of 2007, the defense minister said last month.

Anatoly Serdyukov said these weapon systems included the submarine-launched R-29RM Sineva ballistic missiles, the S-400 Triumf air defense complex, and the 120-mm Nona SM-1 towed mortar for Ground Forces.

Serdykov also said Russia conducted test launches of the Yarts land-based ballistic missile, the X-102 airborne missile, and a new version of the Iskander-M ballistic missile capable of carrying multiple warheads, and launched two military reconnaissance and communication satellites.

http://en.rian.ru/russia/20070901/76058131.html