december
01-08-2007, 03:27 AM
Does Europe Need Protection?
What really underlies the U.S.'s decision to deploy elements of a missile defense system in Eastern Europe?
It would be wrong to look for an answer to this question in its striving to secure itself against the hypothetical launch of Iranian missiles. It is known for certain that Iran does not have - nor is likely to have for at least the next decade - missiles capable of reaching even Eastern, let alone Western Europe. Furthermore, if the desire to protect itself against Iranian missiles was the principal motive behind the decision to deploy a missile defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic, Washington should have agreed to Moscow's offer and swapped it for two Russian radar stations - one in Azerbaijan and the other in the south of Russia (yet to be built). Evidently, the closer a missile defense system is located to a missile launch area, the more reliable and effective the interception. Missiles are the most vulnerable at the boost phase, before their rockets burn out.
Many people believe that the deployment of a U.S. missile defense system in Eastern Europe is directed against Russia. From a military-technical perspective, this view is justified, especially considering that the radar station and interceptor missiles in the Czech Republic and Poland are part of a U.S. national strategic missile defense system. However, American experts cannot but realize that Russia will do everything to neutralize the threat that is being created near its border.
Indeed, Russia has already announced that it will, among other things, deploy missiles targeted at elements of the U.S. missile defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic. Another forced measure is the development of Russian missiles capable of reliably evading the missile defense system that the United States intends to deploy in Eastern Europe. It would be absurd to expect any other reaction from Russia at a time when, according to its military experts, Russian security is being jeopardized - at any rate, an attempt is being made to impose on it decisions that are in conflict with its national interests.
What is the logic behind the U.S.'s moves, and why is it acting in such haste to deploy a missile defense system in Eastern Europe? These questions become especially relevant given Russia's proposal to create a three-way missile defense system, jointly with the United States and the EU. If what is being created is not directed against Russia, Washington should accept this proposal. But it has not received a positive response from the U.S. yet.
It seems to me that the deployment of a missile defense system in Eastern Europe is being dictated not even by military but political considerations linked to U.S.-EU relations. During the Cold War era, the United States managed to enforce ‘bloc discipline' in Europe. The two superpowers, which were in a state of confrontation with each other at the time, drew conglomerates of states into their orbit. Each of those opposing groups was guaranteed security, and based on that, ‘rules of behavior' were dictated. Both the U.S. and the USSR were acting in that way.
However, after the Cold War, when the Soviet Union had ceased to exist, the U.S.'s West European allies no longer needed the American ‘nuclear umbrella.' That created a fundamentally new situation: Western Europe acquired the right to maneuver and a free hand to protect its national interests, which did not entirely coincide with U.S. interests, especially in the economic sphere.
Their newly acquired independence also had political implications. The European Union, especially France and Germany, refused to back the U.S.'s military operation in Iraq at a time when Washington vitally needed the unstinting support of its allies. Certain disagreements emerged between the U.S. and EU countries also on a number of other international problems, in particular Iran. The European Union's position on the Iranian nuclear program did not coincide with that of the U.S., which at first gambled on the use of force, not a political solution. From every indication, Washington is irked by such behavior, which would have been inconceivable during the Cold War era.
Evidently, in these conditions, it became critical for the United States first, to expand its zone of influence in Europe through NATO enlargement: East European countries, which regard NATO membership as a free pass to the EU, are far more compliant than the old members of the North Atlantic alliance; and second, to make an attempt to ‘protect' Europe again. In other words, to throw it back to a situation in which it has to compromise its national interests and show greater obedience.
Providing defense against Russia? Few, if anyone, would believe in this as an overriding priority or accept the risks involved in building a U.S.-controlled anti-Russian system on European soil. But what about providing defense against the Iranian threat?
By Yevgeny Primakov
http://mnweekly.ru/columnists/20070719/55262837.html
http://www.mvdv.ru/expo/0/images/vip_11_250.jpg
Yevgeny Maksimovich Primakov (Евгений Максимович Примаков) (born October 29, 1929) is a Russian politician and a former Prime Minister of Russia. He was also the last Speaker of the Soviet of the Union of the Supreme Soviet, and the Russian Foreign Minister responsible for changing the foreign policy from largely unconditional support of the United States to a more nationalist defense of Russia's interests.
Yevgeny Primakov - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
What really underlies the U.S.'s decision to deploy elements of a missile defense system in Eastern Europe?
It would be wrong to look for an answer to this question in its striving to secure itself against the hypothetical launch of Iranian missiles. It is known for certain that Iran does not have - nor is likely to have for at least the next decade - missiles capable of reaching even Eastern, let alone Western Europe. Furthermore, if the desire to protect itself against Iranian missiles was the principal motive behind the decision to deploy a missile defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic, Washington should have agreed to Moscow's offer and swapped it for two Russian radar stations - one in Azerbaijan and the other in the south of Russia (yet to be built). Evidently, the closer a missile defense system is located to a missile launch area, the more reliable and effective the interception. Missiles are the most vulnerable at the boost phase, before their rockets burn out.
Many people believe that the deployment of a U.S. missile defense system in Eastern Europe is directed against Russia. From a military-technical perspective, this view is justified, especially considering that the radar station and interceptor missiles in the Czech Republic and Poland are part of a U.S. national strategic missile defense system. However, American experts cannot but realize that Russia will do everything to neutralize the threat that is being created near its border.
Indeed, Russia has already announced that it will, among other things, deploy missiles targeted at elements of the U.S. missile defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic. Another forced measure is the development of Russian missiles capable of reliably evading the missile defense system that the United States intends to deploy in Eastern Europe. It would be absurd to expect any other reaction from Russia at a time when, according to its military experts, Russian security is being jeopardized - at any rate, an attempt is being made to impose on it decisions that are in conflict with its national interests.
What is the logic behind the U.S.'s moves, and why is it acting in such haste to deploy a missile defense system in Eastern Europe? These questions become especially relevant given Russia's proposal to create a three-way missile defense system, jointly with the United States and the EU. If what is being created is not directed against Russia, Washington should accept this proposal. But it has not received a positive response from the U.S. yet.
It seems to me that the deployment of a missile defense system in Eastern Europe is being dictated not even by military but political considerations linked to U.S.-EU relations. During the Cold War era, the United States managed to enforce ‘bloc discipline' in Europe. The two superpowers, which were in a state of confrontation with each other at the time, drew conglomerates of states into their orbit. Each of those opposing groups was guaranteed security, and based on that, ‘rules of behavior' were dictated. Both the U.S. and the USSR were acting in that way.
However, after the Cold War, when the Soviet Union had ceased to exist, the U.S.'s West European allies no longer needed the American ‘nuclear umbrella.' That created a fundamentally new situation: Western Europe acquired the right to maneuver and a free hand to protect its national interests, which did not entirely coincide with U.S. interests, especially in the economic sphere.
Their newly acquired independence also had political implications. The European Union, especially France and Germany, refused to back the U.S.'s military operation in Iraq at a time when Washington vitally needed the unstinting support of its allies. Certain disagreements emerged between the U.S. and EU countries also on a number of other international problems, in particular Iran. The European Union's position on the Iranian nuclear program did not coincide with that of the U.S., which at first gambled on the use of force, not a political solution. From every indication, Washington is irked by such behavior, which would have been inconceivable during the Cold War era.
Evidently, in these conditions, it became critical for the United States first, to expand its zone of influence in Europe through NATO enlargement: East European countries, which regard NATO membership as a free pass to the EU, are far more compliant than the old members of the North Atlantic alliance; and second, to make an attempt to ‘protect' Europe again. In other words, to throw it back to a situation in which it has to compromise its national interests and show greater obedience.
Providing defense against Russia? Few, if anyone, would believe in this as an overriding priority or accept the risks involved in building a U.S.-controlled anti-Russian system on European soil. But what about providing defense against the Iranian threat?
By Yevgeny Primakov
http://mnweekly.ru/columnists/20070719/55262837.html
http://www.mvdv.ru/expo/0/images/vip_11_250.jpg
Yevgeny Maksimovich Primakov (Евгений Максимович Примаков) (born October 29, 1929) is a Russian politician and a former Prime Minister of Russia. He was also the last Speaker of the Soviet of the Union of the Supreme Soviet, and the Russian Foreign Minister responsible for changing the foreign policy from largely unconditional support of the United States to a more nationalist defense of Russia's interests.
Yevgeny Primakov - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia