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adimon
05-12-2007, 11:41 PM
Missing Nukes: Treason of the Highest Order

Has Israel anything to do with it? Is there a plan for using the nukes in an event that could repeat the 9/11 saga but in a more catastrophic way -may be somewhere in the States or Europe ? Are they going to setup some Iranians, Arabs or Muslims to use those nukes against US or Europe to create a new excuse to finish Bush's job? Is the CIA (and the Hawks) are planning for something more evil than ever? Have they been smuggled to Israel in order to be used against Iran in future?

by Mahdi Darius Nazemroaya
Global Research, October 29, 2007


Missing Nukes on August 29-30, 2007

According to a wide range of reports, several nuclear bombs were “lost” for 36 hours after taking off August 29/30, 2007 on a “cross-country journey” across the U.S., from U.S.A.F Base Minot in North Dakota to U.S.A.F. Base Barksdale in Louisiana. [1] Reportedly, in total there were six W80-1 nuclear warheads armed on AGM-129 Advanced Cruise Missiles (ACMs) that were “lost.” [2] The story was first reported by the Military Times, after military servicemen leaked the story.



It is also worth noting that on August 27, 2007, just days before the "lost" nukes incident, three B-52 Bombers were performing special missions under the direct authorization of General Moseley, the Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force. [3] The exercise was reported as being an aerial information and image gathering mission. The base at Minot is also home of the 91st Space Wings, a unit under the command of Air Force Space Command (AFSPC).

According to official reports, the U.S. Air Force pilots did not know that they were carrying weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). Once in Louisiana, they also left the nuclear weapons unsecured on the runway for several hours. [4]

U.S. Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Plans, and Requirements, Major-General Richard Y. Newton III commented on the incident, saying there was an “unprecedented” series of procedural errors, which revealed “an erosion of adherence to weapons-handling standards” [5]

These statements are misleading. The lax security was not the result of procedural negligence within the U.S. Air Force, but rather the consequence of a deliberate tampering of these procedures.

If a soldier, marine, airman, or sailor were even to be issued a rifle and rifle magazine — weaponry of a far lesser significance, danger, and cost — there is a strict signing and accountability process that involves a chain of command and paperwork. This is part of the set of military checks and balances used by all the services within the U.S. Armed Forces.

Military servicemen qualified to speak on the subject will confirm that there is a stringent nuclear weapons handling procedure. There is a rigorous, almost inflexible, chain of command in regards to the handling of nuclear weapons and not just any soldier, sailor, airman, or marine is allowed to handle nuclear weapons. Only servicemen specialized in specific handling and loading procedures, are perm certified to handle, access and load nuclear warheads.

Every service personnel that moves or even touches these weapons must sign a tracking paper and has total accountability for their movement. There is good reason for the paperwork behind moving these weapons. The military officers that order the movement of nuclear weapons, including base commanders, must also fill out paper forms.

In other words, unauthorized removal of nuclear weapons would be virtually impossible to accomplish unless the chain of command were bypassed, involving, in this case, the deliberate tampering of the paperwork and tracking procedures.

The strategic bombers that carried the nuclear weapons also could not fly with their loaded nuclear weaponry without the authorization of senior military officials and the base commander. The go-ahead authorization of senior military officials must be transmitted to the servicemen that upload the nuclear weapons. Without this authorization no flights can take place.

In the case of the missing nukes, orders were given and flight permission was granted. Once again, any competent and eligible U.S. Air Force member can certify that this is the standard procedure.

There are two important questions to be answered in relation to the "lost" nukes incident:

1. Who gave the order to arm the W80-1 thermonuclear warheads on the AGM-129 Advanced Cruise Missiles (ACMs)? At what level in the military hierarchy did this order originate? How was the order transmitted down the command chain?

2. If this was not a procedural error, what was the underlying military-political objective sought by those who gave the orders?

The Impossibility of "Losing" Nuclear Weapons

As Robert Stormer, a former U.S. lieutenant-commander in the U.S. Navy, has commented: “Press reports initially cited the Air Force mistake of flying nuclear weapons over the United States in violation of Air Force standing orders and international treaties, while completely missing the more important major issues, such as how six nuclear cruise missiles got loose to begin with.” [6]

Stormer also makes a key point, which is not exactly a secret: “There is a strict chain of custody for all such weapons. Nuclear weapons handling is spelled out in great detail in Air Force regulations, to the credit of that service. Every person who orders the movement of these weapons, handles them, breaks seals or moves any nuclear weapon must sign off for tracking purposes.” [7]

Stormer continues:

“Two armed munitions specialists are required to work as a team with all nuclear weapons. All individuals working with nuclear weapons must meet very strict security standards and be tested for loyalty — this is known as a ‘[Nuclear Weapons] Personnel Reliability Program [DoDD 5210 42].’ They work in restricted areas within eyeshot of one another and are reviewed constantly.”[8]

Stormer unwraps the whole Pentagon cover-up by pointing out some logical facts and military procedures. First he reveals that: “All security forces assigned [to handle and protect nuclear weapons] are authorized to use deadly force to protect the weapons from any threat [including would-be thieves].” [9]

He then points out a physical reality that can not be shrugged aside: “Nor does anyone quickly move a 1-ton cruise missile — or forget about six of them, as reported by some news outlets, especially cruise missiles loaded with high explosives.”

He further explains another physical and procedural reality about nuclear weapons assembly:

“The United States also does not transport nuclear weapons meant for elimination attached to their launch vehicles under the wings of a combat aircraft. The procedure is to separate the warhead from the missile, encase the warhead and transport it by military cargo aircraft to a repository — not an operational bomber base that just happens to be the staging area for Middle Eastern operations.” [10]

This last point raises the question of what were the nuclear weapons meant for? In this context, Stomrer puts forth the following list of important questions to which he demands an answer:

1. Why, and for what ostensible purpose, were these nuclear weapons taken to Barksdale?
2. How long was it before the error was discovered?
3. How many mistakes and errors were made, and how many needed to be made, for this to happen?
4. How many and which security protocols were overlooked?
5. How many and which safety procedures were bypassed or ignored?
6. How many other nuclear command and control non-observations of procedure have there been?
7. What is Congress going to do to better oversee U.S. nuclear command and control?
8. How does this incident relate to concern for reliability of control over nuclear weapons and nuclear materials in Russia, Pakistan and elsewhere?
9. Does the Bush administration, as some news reports suggest, have plans to attack Iran with nuclear weapons?

It is a matter of perception, whether it is “clear” or “unclear”, as to why the nuclear warheads had not been removed beforehand from the missiles.

For those who have been observing these series of “unclear” events it is becoming “clear” that a criminal government is at the helm of the United States. There was no way that the six nuclear missiles could have been “mistakenly” loaded, especially when their separate warheads had to be affixed to the missiles by individuals specialized in such a momentous task.

It is also being claimed that military teams in both U.S.A.F. Base Minot and U.S.A.F. Base Barksdale made major "procedural errors". What are the probabilities of this occurring simultaneously in two locations?

It is also worth noting that original reports from military sources talked about only five of the six nuclear warheads from Minot being accounted for in Barksdale.[11] Nuclear warheads are also kept in specialized storage areas or bunkers. Moreover, nuclear weapons are not being decommissioned at Barksdale.

The Role of the Nuclear Weapons Surety Program: What happened to Electronic Monitoring?

The Nuclear Weapons Surety Program is a joint program between the U.S. Department of Defence and the U.S. Department of Energy. The National Security Agency (NSA) is also involved as well as other U.S. federal government agencies. The Nuclear Weapons System Safety Program is part of this program, which involves a monitoring and safeguards regime for the U.S. nuclear arsenal.

The Nuclear Weapons Security Standard falls under the Nuclear Weapons Surety Program and is in place to disallow any “unauthorized access to nuclear weapons; prevent damage or sabotage to nuclear weapons; prevent loss of custody; and prevent, to the maximum extent possible, radiological contamination caused by unauthorized acts.”

Under this or these safeguards system there also exists a rigorous control of use scheme, which is tied to the military chain of command and the White House.

“Command and Control (C2)” and “Use Control”

“Use control” is a set of security measures designed to prevent unauthorized access to nuclear weapons. These measures involve weapons design features, operational procedures, security, and system safety rules.

“Command and Control” or “C2” involves the Office of the President of the United States of America. C2 is an established line of command, which is tied to the White House. Without it, nuclear weapons cannot be deployed or armed as they were in U.S.A.F. Base Minot. It is these two control elements that establish the basis of authorization through which “absolute control of nuclear weapons” is maintained “at all times.”

In addition to the checks and balances in place in regards to handling nuclear weapons, the Defence Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) and its partners manually and electronically inspect and monitor all U.S. nuclear weapons through the Nuclear Weapon Status Information Systems.

More Unanswered Questions: What Happened to the Computerized Tracking System?

The Nuclear Management Information Systems “interface with each other and provide [the U.S. Department of Defence] with the ability to track the location of nuclear weapons and components from cradle-to-grave [meaning from when they are made to when they are decommissioned].” [12]

The Military Times also makes an omission that exposes the official narrative as false and indicates that the event was not just a mistake: “The Defense Department uses a computerized tracking program to keep tabs on each one of its nuclear warheads, said Hans Kristensen, director of the Nuclear Information Project at the Federation of American Scientists. For the six warheads to make it onto the B-52, each one would have had to be signed out of its storage bunker and transported to the bomber.” [13]

This is where the chain of command in regards to military officers falls into play. If any of the stocked inventories of nuclear weapons are moved to an authorized location they will be noticed and tracked by the DTRA and will require the relevant authorization. There is also a code system involved that is tied to the chain of command.

The fact that the incident only apparently became known to the U.S. Air Force when military personnel reported it, suggests that either the nuclear weapons were ordered to be moved or that the electronic tracking devices had been removed or tampered with. This scenario would need the involvement of individuals with expertise in military electronics or for those responsible for the monitoring of nuclear weapons to look the other way or both.

Mysterious Deaths in the United States Air Force: Whitewash and Cover-up

Several military personnel died under mysterious circumstances shortly before and after the incident. There are now questions regarding the fate of these individuals in the U.S. Air Force who could have had relationships in one way or another to the incident or possibly have been directly involved. It is also necessary to state that there is no proof that these deaths are linked to the August flight from Minot to Barksdale in question.

Citizens for Legitimate Government has pointed towards the involvement of the U.S. Air Force in a cover-up and has linked several deaths of U.S. servicemen to the incident. Lori Price has also stated for Citizens for a Legitimate Government that “you need about fourteen signatures to get an armed nuke on a B-52.”

Based on several news sources, including the U.S. military, we provide below a detailed review of these mysterious and untimely deaths of U.S. servicemen.

Todd Blue



Airman 1st Class Todd Blue went on leave days after the nuclear weapons were “lost.” Blue died under questionable timing while on leave, visiting his family in Wytheville, Virginia at the age of 20 on September 10, 2007. He was a response force member assigned to the 5th Security Forces Squadron. What does this mean?

Airman Todd Blue occupied a key position in weapons systems security at Minot. [14] At Minot U.S.A.F. Base the 5th Security Forces Squadron to which he belonged was responsible for base entry requirements and a particular section, the Weapons System Security section, was responsible for preventing the unauthorized removal of military property. The latter is responsible for security of all priority resources, meaning the security of nuclear weapons. In other words not only did the 5th Security Forces Squadron keep eyes on what entered and left Minot, but they kept an eye on and monitored the nuclear weapons.

John Frueh



U.S. Air Force Captain John Frueh is another serviceman who could have been indirectly connected to the “lost” nuclear weapons. He was reported as being last seen with a GPS device, camera, and camcorder being carried with him in a backpack. Local police in Oregon and the F.B.I. seemed to be looking for him for days. His family also felt that something bad had happened to him.

On September 8, 2007 Captain Frueh was found dead in Washington State, near his abandoned rental car, after the Portland Police Department contacted the Skamania County Sheriff’s Officer. [15] The last time he spoke with his family was August 30, 2007. He had arrived from Florida to attend a wedding that he never showed up at. The Oregonian reported that “Authorities in Portland found no activity on his credit or bank cards since [Frueh] was last seen (...) [and that] the last call from his cell phone was made at 12:28 p.m. [August 30, 2007] from Mill Plain Boulevard and Interstate 205 in Vancouver [Washington State].” [16]

His background was in meteorology and the study of the atmosphere and weather. He was also reported to be a U.S. Air Force pararescue officer. [17] He was also a major-select candidate, which means he was selected for a promotion as a U.S. Air Force major, but was not officially promoted.

Captain Frueh belonged to the U.S.A.F. Special Operations Command. U.S.A.F. Special Operations Command has its headquarters in Hurlburt Field, Florida and is one of nine major Air Force commands. It is also the U.S. Air Force’s component of U.S. Special Operations Command, a unified command located at MacDill Air Force Base, which is also in Florida. The force provides special operations forces for worldwide deployment and assignment to regional unified commands, such as CENTCOM. Its missions include conduct of global special operations. These operations — and this is where careful attention should be paid — range from “precision application of firepower, such as nuclear weapons,” to infiltration, exfiltration (the removal of “devices,” supplies, spies, special agents, or units from enemy territory), re-supply and refuelling of special operational elements.

In Captain Frueh’s case his death is questionable too. The U.S. Air Force would not let a missing persons’ investigation go forward by the police without conducting its own investigation. Usually the different service branches of the U.S. military would investigate for missing servicemen, to see if these individuals are Absent Without Authorized Leave (AWAL) or have deserted, before an individual’s case is handed over to the police.

Clint Huff, Linda Huff, and Weston Kissel

Another military weatherman, along with his wife, also died after August 30, 2007. Senior Airman Clint Huff, belonging to the 26th Operational Weather Squadron and his wife Linda Huff died in a motorcycle accident on September 15, 2007. [18] The husband and wife fatality happened on Shreveport-Blanchard Highway, near U.S.A.F. Base Barksdale, when according to the Caddo Parish Sheriff’s Officer a Pontiac Aztec, a medium-sized SUV, initiated a left turn at the same time that the couple attempted to pass on a no passing zone and collided. [19]



First-Lieutenant Weston Kissel, a B-52H Stratofortress Bomber pilot, also died in a reported Tennessee motorcycle accident. This was while he was on leave in, less than two months from the nuclear B-52 flights, on July 17, 2007. [20] His death came after another single-vehicle accident by another Minot serviceman, Senior Airman Adam Barrs. [21]

Adam Barrs and Stephen Garrett



Senior Airman Barrs died as a passenger in a vehicle being driven by Airman 1st Class Stephen Garrett, also from Minot. Garrett, also belongs to the 5th Aircraft Maintenance Squadron.

The death of Barrs was reported as being part of a single-vehicle car accident. Associated Press reports state that “[Minot] Base officials say 20-year-old Barrs was a passenger in a vehicle that failed to negotiate a curve, hit an approach, hit a tree and started on fire late Tuesday [July 3, 2007] night.” [22] Barrs was pronounced dead on the scene of the accident, while Garrett was taken the hospital with no updates released by the U.S. Air Force. Adam Barrs also belonged to the 5th Aircraft Maintenance Squadron, where he was responsible for the maintenance and securing of the electronic communicational and navigation mission systems aboard the B-52H Stratofortresses on base. The 5th Aircraft Maintenance Squadron is also one of the units that are responsible for loading and unloading weaponry onto the B-52H Stratofortresses.

The deaths of Kissel and Barrs could be dismissed as irrelevant because they occurred prior to the incident. However, Barrs and Kissel could have been in one way or another connected to the advanced planning of the special operation, prior to the incident (special operations are not planned in a few days and may take months and even longer). There is, of course, no proof and only an independent investigation will be able to reveal whether these deaths are connected to the incident.

If there was an internal and secretive operation bypassing most military personnel, a few men in key positions would have to have been involved over a period of time prior to the August 29/30, 2007 flight. Senior Airman Barrs, due to his expertise in communication and navigational systems, could potentially have been involved in the preparations that would have allowed the nuclear weapons to escape detection by military surveillance and be ready for takeoff.

Reprimands, Replacements and Reassignments in the U.S.A.F. Chain of Command

Senior officers, including three colonels and a lieutenant-colonel, are among seventy personnel that will reportedly be disciplined for negligence and for allowing a B-52H Stratofortress Bomber to fly across the U.S. carrying six nuclear-armed cruise missiles that should never have been loaded under its wings. [23]

According to the Military Times, George W. Bush Jr. had been swiftly informed. This is a lockstep procedure. This illustrates the importance tied to the authorization needed for handling nuclear weapons. This is part of a two-way process in regards to authorization from the White House.

The commander of the 5th Munitions Squadron and the commander of the 5th Bomb Wing, Colonel Bruce Emig, have been replaced along with a series of other senior officers. This implies that the U.S. Air Force chain of command is directly involved in this event. None of these senior officers have been authorized to speak or make statements, according to U.S. military sources. Will any of these officers receive lucrative departure packages? Have they been reassigned?

More generally, the nature of the reprimands directed against senior officers involved has not been fully disclosed.

The “memory” of the incident is being erased through a reorganization of the ranks and a purge at U.S.A.F. Base Minot. The streamlining of the chain of command as well as the mysterious deaths of personnel who could have been involved in the incident, raise a series of far-reaching questions.

There are several important issues regarding the senior officers’ chain of command at Minot, which will be addressed in this article. Once again, the most important questions in regards to the missing nukes are: Who gave the orders and authorization for the operation and what where the underlying objectives of loading armed nuclear missiles?

Other Mysterious Deaths: Was the Missing Nukes Incident connected to US War Plans directed against Iran?

Charles D. Riechers



A U.S. Air Force official, Charles D. Riechers, has been found dead on October 14, 2007. [24] Riechers was a retired Air Force officer and master navigator specializing in electronic warfare. He was a member of the Senior Executive Service of the U.S. Air Force, and was the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition and Management. A description of his duties includes “providing sound expert advice and guidance on acquisition and procurement policies, as well as formulating, reviewing and, as assigned, execution of plans, programs and policies relating to organization, function, operation and improvement of the Air Force’s acquisition system.”

He apparently killed himself by running his car’s engine inside his suburban garage in Virginia. The death of Charles D. Riechers has been casually linked by The Washington Post to his involvement in fraudulent activities and embezzlement. [25] The Washington Post reported that the Air Force had asked defense contractor, Commonwealth Research Institute (C.R.I.), to give him a job with no known duties while he waited for official clearance for his promoted rank in the Pentagon. Riechers is quoted as saying: “I really didn’t do anything for C.R.I.,” and “I [still] got a paycheck from them.” The question, of course, was whether the contractor might expect favours in return upon his assignment to the Pentagon last January. [26] A mysterious suicide letter expressing shame was subsequently reported; the letter was reportedly from a man who had already admitted without shame that he was receiving money for doing nothing. This was known to the U.S. Senate, which had approved his promotion.

In a report featured by Pravda, Russian Intelligence analysts have said that the reported suicide of Charles D. Riechers was a cover-up and that he was murdered because of his involvement in the controversial flight of nuclear weapons over the continental United States.

Pravda reports that “Russian Intelligence Analysts are reporting today that American War Leaders have ‘suicided’ [sic] one of their Top US Air Force Officials Charles D. Riechers as the rift growing between the U.S. War Leaders and their Top Military Officers over a nuclear attack on Iran appears to be nearing open warfare.” [27]

According to the Pravda report, the incident was linked to an operation to smuggle nuclear weapons away from the U.S. military in connection to launching a war against Iran.

The Commonwealth Research Institute (CRI), a registered non-profit organization is a subsidiary of Concurrent Technologies, which is registered with the IRS as a tax-exempt charity, which is run by Daniel Richard DeVos. Devos is also an associate of John P. Murtha, who was investigated by the F.B.I. for his Saudi links.

Certainly the ties of the Commonwealth Research Institute (CRI), a non-profit organization working for the Pentagon, are questionable and the organization could be a front for internal operations that bypass most military personnel. The case appears to be part of an internal operation that was being kept a secret from most of the U.S. military, but what for?

Russell E. Dougherty



More than a month before the death of Riechers, General Russell Elliot Dougherty, a retired flag officer, was also reported to have died on September 7, 2007 at his home in Falcon Landing military retirement community in Potomac Falls located in Arlington, Virginia. [28] He once was one of the most senior individuals responsible for the nuclear arsenal of the U.S. military and also the former commander of Strategic Air Command (SAC) and director of the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff, which identified nuclear targets worldwide amongst its responsibilities. At Minot next to his obituary was a military information notice on suicide, telling servicepersons what the signs of suicide are. [29]

Russell Dougherty in the course of his military career in the U.S. Air Force had dealt with the issues pertaining to Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD), full spectrum dominance, how to defeat the enemy and avoid a nuclear war, other uses for nuclear weaponry, Nuclear Primacy for the U.S., and tackling the effects of the wind and weather — due to their unpredictable natures — on the use of nuclear weapons.

The fact that the nuclear warheads were attached to the nuclear cruise missiles could mean that someone wanted to take the weapons in one step or to use them right away.

Timely Appointments at U.S.A.F. Base Minot

Several of the commanding officers at Minot were freshly appointed in June, 2007. This may have been part of standard procedures, but the timing should not be ignored.

Colonel Robert D. Critchlow was transferred, just before the incident, from the Pentagon to Minot and appointed commanding officer for the 91st Operations Group, a missileer unit and the operational backbone of the 91st Space Wing. In Washington, D.C. he was involved in research for the Congressional Research Services and later posted into Air Force Nuclear Response and Homeland Defence.

Colonel Myron L. Freeman was transferred from Japan to Minot in June, 2007. Colonel Freeman was appointed as the commander of the 91st Security Forces Group, which is responsible for securing Minot’s nuclear arsenal.

Colonel Gregory S. Tims was also appointed as deputy commander or vice-commander of the 91st Space Wing in June, 2007. However, Colonel Tims was transfered to Minot from California almost a year before.

One of the most senior non-commissioned officers (NCOs) or non-commissioned members (NCMs), Chief Master Sergeant Mark R. Clark, was also transferred to U.S.A.F. Base Minot from Nebraska in July, 2007.

Colonel Roosevelt Allen was also transferred to Minot from Washington, D.C. to become commander of the 5th Medical Group.

Colonel Bruce Emig, the now-former commander of the 5th Bomb Wing, was also transferred to Minot from U.S.A.F. Base Ellsworth in South Dakota in June, 2007. Colonel Emig was also the base commander of Minot.

Colonel Cynthia M. Lundell, the now-former group commander for the 5th Maintenance Group, the unit responsible for loading and unloading weaponry onto the B-52H Stratofortresses was also freshly transferred from a NATO post in Western Europe in June, 2007. Were these appointments temporary? Were any of these appointments related to the six “lost” nuclear missiles?

Prior to the Missing Nukes Incident, Minot Airmen Meet with the President and the U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff

On June 15, 2007, George W. Bush Jr. met senior officers from U.S.A.F. Base Minot at U.S.A.F. Base McConnell in Wichita, Kansas during a visit to Boeing’s Integrated Defense Systems facility. Amongst them was Major Daniel Giacomazza of the 5th Operational Support Squadron.

Senator Patrick Roberts of Kansas was also present. “While he chaired the Senate Intelligence Committe from 2002 to 2007, [Senator] Roberts stonewalled attempts to investigate everything from the manipulation of intelligence in the rush to war in Iraq, President Bush’s warrantless wiretaps, and even allegations of the use of torture by the CIA,” according to Associated Press (AP) reports. [30] The same report also indicates that the U.S. President was in Wichita for a political fundraiser, and stopped at a new Boys and Girls Club of America to defray the costs of getting to Wichita via Air Force One for Senator Roberts’ campaign.

Military sources have reported that a B-52H Stratofortress was flown to Wichita so that Boeing’s engineers could take a look in order to make adjustments to the war planes for a new military program. [31] Nothing has been reported about any private meetings between President Bush Jr. or any of his presidential staff and the personnel from Minot. However, reports have been made of meetings between military families and the U.S. President in his office on Air Force One.



General Moseley, the Air Force Chief of Staff, had previously visited Minot on March 14-15, 2007, a month before Minot airmen went to Wichita. [32] If a secret mission was being prepared, these events could have played a role in the recruiting phases for an important internal special operation. Following their recruitment, Minot servicemen could have symbolically met General Moseley or White House officials to understand that the mission was being sanctioned by the highest ranks and offices in the United States.

Orders had to Come from the Top: Treason of the Highest Order

Orders had to come from higher up.

The operation would not have been possible without the involvement of more than one individual in the highest ranks of the U.S. Air Force command structure and the Pentagon.

The only way to bypass these separate chains of command is “to be above them” (from higher up), as well as have the possibility of directly overseeing their implementation.

These orders would then have been communicated to lower levels in the US Air Force command chain in different locations, to allow for a so-called “oversight” to proceed. The alternative to this is “an alternative chain of command,” although this also needs someone in the highest ranks of office to organize and oversee.

The post given to Riechers was politically motivated, given his track record in the U.S. Air Force. Riechers had been in a position of responsibility in the U.S. Air Force special operational support activities; something he had in common with Russell Dougherty, the former SAC commander. He would have been one of the best suited individuals for making arrangements in the case of an alternative command structure for a secretive nuclear operation. Moreover, he already had a record of corrupt behaviour through his involvement with the Commonwealth Research Institute. The possible involvement of U.S. Air Force weathermen and special operatives raises many questions as to what exactly was the objective of making the nuclear weapons disappear. [33]

The Investigation

The U.S. Air Force has publicly stated that it has made a “mistake,” which is very unusual and almost unprecedented for a military organization that tries to continually assure the American public of their safety.

The fact that seventy or more military personnel have been punished in the case of the “lost” nuclear weapons does not mean, however, that the senior commanding officers responsible for having carried out the special operation will be identified and punished.

Quite the opposite. The investigation could indeed result in a camouflage of the chain of command, where lower-ranking military personnel are accused and court-martialed, with a view to ultimately protecting those in high office who have committed an act of treason.

The series of deaths mentioned above, may have no ties whatsoever with the the August flight in question from Minot to Barksdale, but the issues of command, monitoring, and authorization cannot be overlooked or ignored. The American people have before them a case of treason that involves the highest offices of government and most probably the offices of the President and the Vice-President.

Once again, the “C2” process involves the Office of the President and Commander-in-Chief. It is an established line of command, without which nuclear weapons could not have been deployed or armed as they were in U.S.A.F. Base Minot. It is this command element that establishes the basis of authorization through which “absolute control of nuclear weapons” is maintained “at all times.”



With time it is possible that military servicemen and servicewomen may come forward with more information.

However, in the meantime, there has been a streamlining of military personnel at U.S.A.F. Minot. Base personnel have become dispersed and reassigned to other locations.

If they on the grounds of loyalty to their country, the United States of America, come forward and reveal what has taken place, they are to be saluted with full honour by all ranks. As George Orwell said, “In a time of universal deceit, telling the truth becomes a revolutionary act,” and indeed these are deceitful times.

The fact that U.S. Air Force officers came forward and reported this incident is contrary to U.S. military procedures, regulations, and laws. The U.S. military will never release any information that will risk or damage its reputation. Any information in regards to nuclear weapons can not be released without prior consultations with and authorization by the White House.

The nuclear weapons were armed and moved deliberately. Orders had to have come from the highest echelons of the U.S. government.

The question is what exactly were they meant for? Were they part of a war agenda or something else?

Bush Threatens Iran with Nuclear Weapons

What adds intrigue to an understanding of the missing nukes, are the international events and war games taking place just after the “lost” nuclear weapons incident, not to mention the President’s ongoing threats to attack Iran with nuclear weapons and Vice President Cheney's repeated warnings that a second large scale terrorist attack on America is under preparation, with the support of Iran.

In the U.S., under the Vigilant Shield 2008 war games (initiated in September, 2007) and the TOPOFF anti-terrorism exercises, some form of nuclear terrorist attack on American soil had been envisaged. The roles of Russia and China had also been contemplated. The latter would be “a likely scenario” had the U.S. attacked Iran and as a result Russia and China had decided to intervene. [34] Under Vigilant Shield 2007, held in 2006, the possibility of a nuclear war with Iran’s allies, Russia and China, had been contemplated in the war games scenario.

The Kremlin has responded by holding its own war games.[35]

An unveiled threat to trigger World War Three has been the response of George W. Bush Jr. to Russia’s statements warning that a U.S. sponsored war with Iran, could result in an escalating World War III scenario.

The six nuclear warheads were not meant for use in theatre operations against Iran. This is obvious because if they were then they would have been deployed via the proper procedural routes without the need to hide anything. Besides, there are already theatre-level nuclear weapons ready and armed in Europe and the Middle East for any possible Middle Eastern mission. There was something more to the incident.

It is also worth noting that the Israelis launched an attack on an alleged Syrian nuclear facility that both Tel Aviv and the White House claim was constructed with the assistance of North Korea. This event has been used, through official statements and media disinformation, to draw a Syria-Iran-North Korea nuclear proliferation axis. [36]

In regards to the case of the missing nuclear weapons, weathermen and military personnel with an expertise in space and missile components were involved. The incident took place during a time when the U.S. missile shield projects in Eastern Europe and Eastern Asia, directed against Russia and China, were raising international tensions and alarms. On October 23, 2007, President Bush Jr. stated: “The need for missile defence in Europe is real and I believe it’s urgent.” [37]

Nuclear warfare, the militarization of space, and “the missile shield” are interrelated military processes. The overtones of Nuclear Primacy are hanging in the air. One of the goals of the U.S. military has been to effectively shield itself from a potential Russian or potential Russian and Chinese nuclear response to a nuclear “First Strike” from the U.S. military. [38] The militarization of space is also deeply linked to this military project. Like their advanced knowledge about the U.S. missile shield project, Russian and Chinese officials have got wind of these ambitions and are fully aware of what the U.S. intends to do.

Mahdi Darius Nazemroaya is an independent writer based in Ottawa specializing in Middle Eastern affair. He is a Research Associate of the Centre for Research on Globalization (CRG).


NOTES

[1] Sarah Baxter, US hits panic button as air force ‘loses’ nuclear missiles, The Times (U.K.), October 21, 2007.

[2] The Nuclear Reactions Data Centres also estimated that the W80-1 stockpile included a total of 1,400 warheads remain in stockpile associated with the 900 ALCMs that are in storage with their warheads removed.

[3] Baxter, US hits panic button, Op. cit.

[4] John Andrew Prime, Barksdale bombers expand B-52 capabilities, The Sheveport Times, August 27, 2007.

[5] Baxter, US hits panic button, Op. cit.; Major-General Newton is also responsible for formulating policy supporting air, space, nuclear, counter-proliferation, homeland, weather, and cyber operations. Because of his role as one of the Air Forces’ key flag officers in regards to nuclear issues and counter-proliferation he has been involved in war planning in regards to Iran, Israeli preparations for attacks on Syria, and the 2006 Israeli war against Lebanon.

[6] Robert Stormer, Nuke transportation story has explosive implications, Fort Worth Star-Telegram, Octobers 8, 2007.

[7] Ibid.; To help ensure adequate shipboard security, TLAM-N is protected by an intrusion detection alarm system that indicates an intrusion, both visually and audibly, at a continuously manned station capable of dispatching a security team.

[8] Ibid.

[9] Ibid.

[10] Ibid.

[11] Michael Hoffman, B-52 mistakenly flies with nukes aboard, Military Times, September 10, 2007; Associated Press sources also made the same report. Military Times simply changed their article and AP withdrew its report on the basis of a factual error.

[12] Office of the Inspector General, U.S. Department of Defence (DoD), Year 2000 Status of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency Nuclear Weapon Information Tracking Systems, Report No. 99-235 (August 19, 1999).

[13] Michael Hoffman, Commander disciplined for nuclear mistake, Militarty Times, September 7, 2007.

[14] Minot Airman dies while on leave, Minot Air Force Base Public Affairs, September 12, 2007.

[15] Body of missing Air Force captain found, Associated Press, September 10, 2007.

[16] Kimberly Wilson, Portland police seek Air Force weatherman missing on trip, The Oregonian, September 5, 2007.

[17] U.S. Air Force operatives that are tasked with recovery and medical treatment of personnel in war environments, as well as handling astronauts returning from space. They are the only members of the U.S. military that are specially trained and equipped to conduct personnel recovery operations in hostile or denied areas as a primary mission.

[18] Victims in Saturday motorcycle accident identified, The Sheveport Times, September 16, 2007; Notice of Active Duty Death, The Bombardier, September 21, 2007, p.1.

[19] John Andrew Prime, Caddo deputies work double fatality accident, The Sheveport Times, September 15, 2007.

[20] Minot Airman dies in motorcycle accident, Minot Air Force Base Public Affairs, July 18, 2007.

[21] Minot Airman identified, Minot Air Force Base Public Affairs, July 5, 2007.

[22] Authorities identify Minot airman killed in crash, Associated Press, July 5, 2007.

[23] Baxter, US hits panic button, Op. cit.

[24] Air Force official found dead, The Tribune-Democrat, October 16, 2007; Ginger Thompson and Eric Schmitt, Top Air Force Official Dies in Apparent Suicide, The New York Times, October 16, 2007.

[25] Robert O’Harrow Jr., Air Force Arranged No-Work Contract: Experts Question Official’s Deal With Nonprofit, The Washington Post, October 1, 2007, p.A01.

[26] Ibid.

[27] Top US Air Force official ‘suicided’ [sic] as Iran war nears, Pravda, October 16, 2007.

[28] Yvonne Shinhoster Lamb, Obituaries: Russell E. Dougherty, The Washington Post, October 13, 2007, p.B06.

[29] General Dougherty, former SAC commander, dies, The Bombardier, September 21, 2007, p.9.

[30] Deb Reichmann, Bush Raises Money for Kansas Senator, Associated Press, June 15, 2007.

[31] Warbirds meet commander and chief, Minot Air Force Base Public Affairs, June 22, 2007.

[32] Staff Sergeant Trevor Tiernan, CSAF visits Minot, Minot Air Force Base Public Affairs, March 16, 2007.

[33] Infra. n.38.

[34] Mahdi Darius Nazemroaya, Vigilant Shield 2008: Terrorism, Air Defences, and the Domestic Deployment of the US Military, Centre for Research on Globalization (CRG), October 6, 2007; Michel Chossoduvsky, Dangerous Crossroads: US Sponsored War Games, Centre for Research on Globalization (CRG), October 6, 2007; The March to War: NATO Preparing for War with Serbia? Centre for Research on Globalization (CRG), October 19, 2007.

[35] Michel Chossudovsky, New Cold War: Simultaneously, Russia and America Conduct Major War Games, Centre for Research on Globalization, October 16, 2007.

[36] Both the U.S. and Israeli governments cite the arrival of a North Korean ship with alleged nuclear-related cargo as proof, but one needs only point out one fact to dislodge this claim. The U.S. government has setup an internationally illegal program involved in policing the seas and maritime traffic, the International Proliferation Initiative (IPI). Under the IPI the U.S. has been illegally stopping North Korean vessels and inspecting them, especially when they have suspected suspicious materials. Hereto, North Korea has not been given any carte blanches from vessel inspections. The U.S. Navy and NATO vessels have a virtual cordon of the waterways around the Middle East from the Indian Ocean to the Read Sea and Mediterranean Sea. If the North Korean vessel had nuclear materials it would never have reached Syria.

[37] Missile shield is ‘urgent’ - Bush, British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), October 23, 2007.

The U.S. is well in the process of implementing the recommendations of the Project for the New American Century (PNAC); “[The United States must] develop and deploy missile defences to defend the American homeland and American allies, and to provide a secure basis for U.S. power projection around the world,” and “Control the new ‘international commons’ of space and cyberspace and pave the way for the creation of a new military service — U.S. Space Forces — with the mission of space control.”

Thomas Donnelly et al., Rebuilding America’s Defenses: Strategy, Forces, and Resources For A New Century (The Project for the New American Century: September 2000), p.v.

[38] It is here that two things should be noted in regards to physics and magnetospheric physics; Firstly, nuclear explosions from the air are different than ground-based nuclear explosions in many ways (including contamination levels), but the weather and wind direction are major unknowns or variables; Secondly, as a fundamental natural law energy never disappears, it only changes or is transferred. The energy from nuclear explosions can theoretically be transferred into the Earth’ magnetic radiation fields, called the Van Allen Belt or the Van Allen Belts, and used to energize and excite various particles, sub-atomic particles, and ions. Tentatively, if manipulated this can have harmful results on surface areas, including burning electronic and communication devices, and military applications such as disrupting satellites in space. If this were possible Russian, Chinese, Iranian, or Indian military defences, communications, and missile facilities could be effortlessly neutralized.

These radiation belts also travel in loops and notionally an energized pulse set off from an area in the U.S. could circumnavigate into an area halfway around the globe.



In fact the U.S. military has been experimenting with manipulating the radiation belts since the end of the Second World War. The U.S. Navy’s Project Argus, taking place from August to September 1958, is an example. A total of five nuclear weapons were used; three atom bombs (weapons using nuclear fission) were detonated above the Atlantic Ocean and two thermonuclear or hydrogen bombs (weapons using nuclear fusion) in the Pacific Ocean in an effort to manipulate the Van Allen Belts.

Global Research Articles by Mahdi Darius Nazemroaya
http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=7158
2007 United States Air Force nuclear weapons incident
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (2007 United States Air Force nuclear weapons incident - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia)

The 2007 United States Air Force nuclear weapons incident was an incident at Minot Air Force Base and Barksdale Air Force Base on August 29 – 30, 2007 in which six "live" AGM-129 ACM cruise missiles (each armed with a W80-1 variable yield nuclear warhead) were mistakenly loaded on a United States Air Force (USAF) B-52H heavy bomber in place of six unarmed AGM-129 missiles that were awaiting transport from Minot to Barksdale for disposal. The live missiles were not reported missing and remained mounted to the aircraft at both Minot and Barksdale for a period of 36 hours. During this period, the warheads were not protected by the various mandatory security precautions required for nuclear weapons.
Contents
[hide]

* 1 Background
* 2 Incident
* 3 Response by the USAF and Department of Defense
* 4 Nuclear weapons policy
* 5 Terminology
* 6 References
o 6.1 Notes
o 6.2 Books
o 6.3 Web

Background

Minot Air Force Base is the home of the 5th Bomb Wing, which according to the USAF's statement on the wing's mission, serves with its B-52 bombers as part of the USAF's conventional and strategic combat force.[1] The "strategic" portion of the 5th's mission consists of the ability to deliver nuclear weapons against potential targets worldwide. Thus, Minot Air Force Base stores and maintains a ready arsenal of nuclear bombs, nuclear warheads, and associated delivery systems, including, as of August 2007, the AGM-129 Advanced Cruise Missile.[2]

The AGM-129 was fielded in 1987 as a stealthy cruise missile platform to deliver the W80-3 variable yield nuclear warhead. Although originally designed to equip the B-1 bomber, it was later decided that the AGM-129 would only be carried by the B-52, mounted on external pylons on the wings.[3]

In March 2007, the USAF decided to retire its AGM-129 complement. In order to do so, the USAF began to transport its AGM-129s stored at Minot by B-52s to Barksdale Air Force Base in Louisiana for ultimate disposal. By August 29, 2007 more than 200 AGM-129s had been shipped from Minot to Barksdale in this manner.[4]

Incident

At 09:12 on August 29, a group of USAF airmen entered one of the weapons storage bunkers at Minot to prepare AGM-129 missiles for transport to Barksdale that day. That day's scheduled missile transport was to have consisted of 12 AGM-129 Advanced Cruise Missiles, installed with training warheads, with six missiles per pylon and one pylon mounted under each wing of the B-52 transport aircraft. When the airmen entered the bunker the missiles were already installed on the underwing pylons and the nuclear warheads in the missiles were supposed to have been already replaced with the dummy training warheads. In this case, however, six of the missiles still carried nuclear warheads.[5]

The AGM-129 ACM is a "stealth missile" incorporating a low-observable radar-absorbent paint scheme which prevents use of the traditional colored marking bands or stenciling used to identify different missile "loads", rendering the missiles externally identical. Thus, the only available external method for easily determining the missile's current status is to directly look at the warhead through a postage-stamp sized Plexiglas window on the casing; the normal W80 Mod-1 warhead has a WR (War Reserve) marking and the dummy warhead shows a TR (Training Use Only) marking. (Correctly, only training shape missile have Training Use Only across the side. All live missiles have only US Air Force markings on them. No live missile has a stripe or other marking.)

The maintenance crew and munitions officer that issued the pylon with the nuclear warheads installed did not properly verify that the warheads had been removed and training shapes installed. The transport crew that towed the pylon to the flightline did not verify that training shapes were installed, apparently trusting the crew that issued the pylon. The loading crew that uploaded the pylon to the B-52 aircraft did not verify that training shapes were installed apparently trusting everyone before them. After taking eight hours to attach the pylons to the aircraft, the aircraft with the missiles loaded then remained parked overnight at Minot for 15 hours without special guard as required for nuclear weapons.[6]

The flight officer who conducted the next morning's inspection at Minot before takeoff only closely inspected the six missiles on the right wing, which were all properly uploaded with training warheads, before signing the manifest listing the cargo as a dozen unarmed AGM-129 missiles. Finally, the pilot did not do a final verification check.[7]

The B-52 departed Minot and landed at Barksdale at 11:23 on August 30. The aircraft remained parked and without special guard until 20:30, when a munitions team arrived to remove the missiles. After a member of the munitions crew noticed something unusual about some of the missiles, at 22:00 a "skeptical" supervisor finally determined that nuclear warheads were present and ordered them secured and the incident reported, 36-hours after the missiles were removed from the bunker at Minot.[8]

The incident was reported to the National Military Command Center as a Bent Spear incident, which indicates a nuclear weapon incident that is of significant concern, but does not involve the immediate threat of nuclear war (Pinnacle - Nucflash) or the accidental detonation of or severe damage to a nuclear weapon (Pinnacle - Broken Arrow). The incident would also not qualify as a Pinnacle - Empty Quiver incident, since the weapons were not technically "lost" at any point, having never left US Air Force custody. The incident was the first of its kind in 40 years in the United States.[9]

adimon
05-12-2007, 11:42 PM
Response by the USAF and Department of Defense

The USAF at first decided to conceal the incident, in part due to the USAF policy not to comment on the storage or movement of nuclear weapons and to an apparent belief that the incident wouldn't generate much public concern. In fact, the DoD Broken Spear incident report reportedly contained the passage, "No press interest anticipated." Details of the incident, however, were leaked by unknown DoD officials to the Military Times newspaper, which published a small article on the incident on September 5.[10]

In response, in a September 5, 2007 news briefing in the Pentagon by Press Secretary Geoff Morrell, it was stated that at no time the public was in any danger and that military personnel had custody of the weapons at all times. Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force, General T. Michael Moseley quickly called the Secretary of Defense on August 31st to inform him about the incident and the Secretary requested daily updates regarding the investigation. According to the Press Secretary "...that it's important enough that President Bush was notified of it, so it's clearly important." [11]

Within days of the incident, the USAF relieved the Minot munitions squadron commander and disciplined several airmen. A USAF major general was assigned to lead an investigation into the incident. The DoD announced that a Pentagon-appointed scientific advisory panel would study the mishap as part of a larger review of procedures for handling nuclear weapons.[12]

On September 21, 2007 the York Dispatch reported, that a second, external inquiry was under way.[citation needed]

CNN reported on October 19, 2007, that the Pentagon's probe found "...lack of effective leadership and supervision." The report stated that "...a limited number of airmen at both locations failed to follow procedures." Four officers were reportedly relieved of duty, including the Minot wing commander and maintenance crew commander and the Barksdale operational group commander. Additionally, a number of personnel, including the entire 5th Bomb Wing[citation needed], have lost their certification to handle sensitive weaponry.

Maj. Gen. Dick Newton, assistant deputy chief of staff for operations, said the Air Force will refer the matter to a convening authority to determine if additional charges or actions will be taken.[13]

Nuclear weapons policy

In 1968 after several accidents with airborne nuclear weapons, the Air Force banned the transport of nuclear weapons by air.[citation needed]

See also: Palomares hydrogen bombs incident

Terminology

See also: United States military nuclear incident terminology

According to the United States nuclear incident terminology, the incident was reported to the National Command Authority as a "Bent Spear" incident, which is less serious than a Pinnacle - Broken Arrow or Pinnacle - Empty Quiver incident. There was no damage to the warheads and they were never actually "lost" by the Empty Quiver definition (having never left US Air Force custody).

September 5, 2007, 1:41 pm
Loose Nukes: Warheads in the Sky

By Mike Nizza

Tags: military, nuclear weapons
Loose Nukes: Warheads in the SkyA file photo of a B-52 bomber. (Photo: David Castro/Guahan Magazine)

The Military Times brings word of a screw-up in the United States Air Force that has already cost a squadron leader his command and sent shocked headlines around the Web.

On Aug. 30, a B-52 bomber took off from Minot Air Force base in North Dakota with between five and six nuclear warheads, the report says. They were supposed to be detached from cruise missiles before the flight.

The good news: the plane did not embark on some rogue mission straight out of TV’s “24,” instead landing safely and without the intervention of Jack Bauer at Barksdale Air Force Base in Louisiana.

The bad news: the weapons were missing from Minot during the three-hour flight, and no alarms sounded. At first glance, that’s extremely scary — loose nukes! — but there was “never a danger to the American public,” according to one official quoted by the Military Times. Even if the bomber crashed, there would be no nuclear detonation:

A crash could ignite the high explosives associated with the warhead, and possibly cause a leak of the plutonium, but the warheads’ elaborate safeguards would prevent a nuclear detonation from occurring, [Steve Fetter, a former Defense Department official who worked on nuclear weapons policy in 1993-94,] said.

“The main risk would have been the way the Air Force responded to any problems with the flight because they would have handled it much differently if they would have known nuclear warheads were onboard,” he said.

The military immediately sent alerts up the chain of command, including President Bush and Gen. Peter Pace , the chairman of the joint chiefs, Agence France Presse said.

And the Air Force launched an immediate investigation “to find the cause of the mistake and figure out how it could have been prevented,” the Military Times said. It evidently faulted the squadron commander, as a fairly damning quote — “the Air Force has lost all confidence in his ability to handle nuclear weapons” — suggests in an NBC News report.

Friday, 9:03 a.m. Eastern Arms Control Wonk notices a news release from Minot Air Force Base with a headline that is extremely funny in hindsight: “Enjoy a safe Labor Day weekend.”
Will Bush really bomb Iran?
The rhetoric is getting stronger, the sanctions tougher and military planning more detailed. Iran is now the focus of attention in Washington
Sarah Baxter

In the white desert sands of New Mexico, close to where the first atom bomb was detonated, America’s biggest conventional weapon was tested last spring. A 30,000lb massive ordnance penetrator, known as the Big Blu or the Mother of All Bombs, was placed inside a tunnel to test its explosive power against hard, deeply buried bunkers and tunnels designed to conceal weapons of mass destruction.

The monster bunker-buster was so heavy, it could not fly. But the blast was a huge success, rippling through the tunnels and destroying everything in its wake.

Today the Big Blu might as well have “Tehran” written on its side in the same way that the Iranians love to parade missiles marked “Tel Aviv”. Tucked away in an emergency defence spending request, the US air force has just asked Congress for $88m to equip B2 stealth bombers, the black warriors of the skies, with racks strong enough carry the huge bomb.

This was no casual request, but an “urgent operational need from theatre commanders”, according to the air force. Even a Republican congressman fretted: “This whole thing . . . reminds me of the movie Dr Strangelove.”
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* Iranians study nuclear physics in Britain

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In the 1964 film starring Peter Sellers, a demented general launches a unilateral strike on the Soviet Union, convinced it is already stealthily undermining America. Global nuclear destruction ensues. THE end result might not be so grave, but are America’s B2s being readied for an attack on Iran? It would fit in neatly with President George W Bush’s recent warning about the dangers of a third world war, should Iran be allowed to obtain the “knowledge to make a nuclear weapon”.

Iran-watchers noted with interest the use of the word knowledge. Bush, it appeared, was determined to act well before the mullahs got anywhere close to an actual bomb.

Dick Cheney, the vice-president, piled on the pressure last week, calling Iran a “growing obstacle to peace in the Middle East” and vowing “serious consequences” if it persisted with its nuclear programme.

A senior Pentagon source, who remembers the growing drumbeat of war before the invasion of Iraq, believes Bush is preparing for military action before he leaves office in January 2009. “This is for real now. I think he is signalling he is going to do it,” he said.

But nobody is sure whether the president really will add a risky third front to the Afghan and Iraq wars that are already overstretching US forces.

“If you’d asked me a year ago, I’d have said yes,” said John Bolton, the hawkish former US ambassador to the United Nations. “Today I’d say, I don’t know.”

It is clear the military machinery for an attack is being put into place. More than 1,000 targets have been identified for a potential air blitz against Iran’s nuclear facilities, air defences and Revolutionary Guard bases, despite claims last week by Robert Gates, the defence secretary, that the planning was merely “routine”.

As for the urgent request for the Big Blu, it has “bombing Iran written all over it”, said John Pike, a defence expert at the think tank Globalsecurity.org.

Iran’s uranium enrichment halls at Natanz, about 150 miles south of Tehran, are buried 75ft deep, while there are believed to be nuclear sites buried under granite mountains in tunnels that are like the long roots of a tree. It is not enough to drop a smart bomb down a shaft – it has to have the capacity to blast sideways with massive force.

The question of timing is becoming ever more urgent, now that Bush has fewer than 15 months left in the White House. Confidants say he is determined not to bequeath the problem of a nuclear Iran to his successor and regards it as an important part of his legacy.

Although intelligence estimates vary as to when Iran will achieve the know-how for a bomb, the French government recently received a memo from the International Atomic Energy Agency stating that Iran will be ready to run almost 3,000 cen-trifuges in 18 cascades by the end of this month, in defiance of a UN ban on uranium enrichment. It is enough, say scientists, to produce one bomb within a year. If that is the case, the hour for action may soon be upon us.

Against this backdrop, the US public is growing acclimatised to the threat of war. As the saying in Washington goes, “Iran is the new Iraq”. While controversy over the Iraq war is fading in intensity – even for the 2008 presidential candidates – the problem of a nuclear Iran is rapidly moving up the political agenda.

David Miliband, the foreign secretary, was in Washington last week for talks with Condoleezza Rice, the US secretary of state. Shortly before heading back to Britain, he declared that, for the first time, Iraq was not “the top item” for discussion, a sign of the growing stability and success of the American troop surge.

According to a spokesman for US armed forces chiefs, there was not a single military casualty last week – Iraqi or American – in Anbar, formerly a hotbed of trouble.

In so far as Iraq is presented as a threat to international security, it is increasingly in connection to growing friction with Iran.

General David Petraeus, the US commander in Iraq, stated baldly last month that America was already fighting a proxy war with Iran, which is arming the sectarian militias and smuggling in weapons and sophisticated roadside bombs designed to kill American soldiers.

The US is building a forward base in Iraq called Combat Outpost Shocker just five miles from the Iranian border as a sign of its new aggressiveness against interference from President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s regime.

Bush’s decision to approve tough unilateral sanctions against Iran last week and to designate the Iranian Revolutionary Guard a terrorist organisation and proliferator of weapons of mass destruction marks a further escalation of the war of words and deeds with Tehran.

After Miliband was briefed on the move during his visit to Washington, Gordon Brown batted for America in the House of Commons by promising Britain would lead the effort to secure a tough sanctions resolution against Iran at the United Nations security council.

All the evidence appears to point in the direction of increasing diplomatic and military hostilities. As Robert Byrd, a Democrat member of the Senate armed services committee, put it, the action by the Bush administration “not only echoes the chest-pounding rhetoric” which preceded the invasion of Iraq in 2003, “but also raises the spectre of an intensified effort to make the case for an invasion of Iran”.

Yet a Downing street source said: “They are not at that stage.”

Could it all be an elaborate game of “chicken”, using the growing threat of an attack to force Ahmadinejad to back down on his nuclear ambitions?

Nick Burns, the State Department’s leading negotiator on Iran, said last week the imposition of new sanctions merely “supports the diplomacy and in no way, shape or form does it anticipate the use of force”.

Even the urgent request to fund the Big Blu may not be all that it seems. “We could be trying to turn up the volume to get the ayatollahs to pay attention,” said Pike. “It could be part of the diplomatic pressure to see if the Iranians will move voluntarily.”

If Ahmadinejad is to be believed, nothing will deter Iran from pursuing its nuclear programme, which he claims is for peaceful energy purposes while at the same time boasting that Israel will one day be wiped off the map.

In a surprise announcement, Iran’s top nuclear negotiator, Ali Larijani, was replaced by Saeed Jalili, a hardliner close to the president. Confusingly, however, Larijani still appeared to lead last week’s talks in Rome with Javier Solana, the European Union’s foreign policy chief.

“I found the same Larijani and he had the role of chief negotiator,” said Solana. It suggests a power struggle over the extent to which Iran can continue to thwart the West.

Until recently, most Iranians discounted the threat of an attack on the grounds that America had its hands full with Iraq, but their mood is altering. At gatherings in Tehran, the talk has turned to possible American bombing raids.

Ali Nazeri, 35, a shopkeeper in the Iranian capital, said: “The government says the Americans cannot do a damn thing, but they are also changing the leadership of the Revolutionary Guard and saying they will fire thousands of missiles at US targets within the first few minutes of a confrontation. I think it is a matter of putting two and two together and coming to the conclusion that war is very likely.”

In the wider Middle East, the conviction is growing that America is determined to launch an attack. Some well-placed Israeli and Palestinian sources suggest that next month’s Middle East peace conference in Annapolis, near Washington, could be the catapult for an ambitious plan to establish a Palestinian state and disarm Iran.

“The idea is to tie Palestine to Iran,” said an Israeli Middle East expert. “Israel will be obliged to accept the establishment of a Palestinian state within a short and firm timetable and the US administration will guarantee that the Iranian nuclear issue will be solved before Bush leaves office.”

If Israel is prepared to move towards the creation of a Palestinian state, the hope is that Sunni Arab regimes such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt will not protest too loudly about a US attack on Iran, given their own private fears about the impact of a nuclear Iran on the balance of power in the region.

As with the Israeli bombing of a suspected Syrian nuclear site last month, they could simply stay mum. In theory, Bush could thus broker a settlement in the Middle East, while denuclearising Iran – a tempting legacy.

adimon
14-02-2008, 12:08 PM
I'm very surprised that on a forum such as this there have been no other threads discussing this matter.

So...consequently...

BUMP!

cruise4
14-02-2008, 12:57 PM
It was extensively covered in the PrisonPlanet and other forums. 6 die within days and 20 odd dead now isn't there? They refused orders. Just shows some in the military have some sense left. Have you heard that 5 US top brass have threatened resignation if Bush orders an attack on Iran?

adimon
14-02-2008, 02:24 PM
It was extensively covered in the PrisonPlanet and other forums. 6 die within days and 20 odd dead now isn't there? They refused orders. Just shows some in the military have some sense left. Have you heard that 5 US top brass have threatened resignation if Bush orders an attack on Iran?

No, I hadn't heard that. Do you have a link Cruise4? :)

resistance
14-02-2008, 03:52 PM
Interesting stuff, it was discussed on a thread last year though

http://www.davidicke.com/forum/showthread.php?t=8996&highlight=missing+nukes

It seems people have been dying all over the place on this one. That would not go unnoticed by military commanders.

seanie
14-02-2008, 04:29 PM
Have to say adimon great piece of research there. well done

cruise4
14-02-2008, 05:18 PM
I suggest you join the Prisonplanet forum adimon. Its a wealth of information. I can't keep looking for others info. Its too time consuming. I followed all this at the time and they haven't got the best search facility ever made. Not trying to be funny or anything.