adimon
02-12-2007, 08:21 PM
N.B> Although I told my Department I had not got copies of Hitler's Books, I do possess them. But wasn't allowed to quote them directly.
In answer of the question, "Was Nazi foreign policy aimed at world domination?", analysis will concentrate mainly on two subjects - the foreign policy devised and orchestrated by Adolf Hitler - between the publication of the Second Volume of “Mein Kampf” in December 1926, and his death in April 1945; and secondly, on the military and diplomatic actions of the Nazi state during the period 1936-1945. World domination will be defined as 'majority world control', not as 'world government'. Therefore, it will be shown that Nazi foreign policy was aimed at making The Third Reich ('Reich' meaning 'empire') the most powerful political force in the world, thus dominating the globe. This paper makes no suggestion that the Nazis planned to make the whole of the globe subject to the Reich's government, nor is this suggestion necessary to the question. Dominion is not the same as rule.
Despite the controversial nature of the title question, length constraints considerably limit any historiographical analysis of Nazi foreign policy. Whilst the argument is made by some historians that the "chaotic nature of decision-making" (Geary, 2000: 10) and Hitler's allegedly 'repeated indecisions' present to us a view of foreign policy not as Hitler's programme but as a more flexible and organic 'direction', it will be the belief of this paper that as Fuhrer, Hitler was almost completely in control of Nazi foreign policy. Some of the Reich's actions late in World War Two may not have been directly organised by him, but these actions remain in keeping with the political desires that were conceived in Hitler's writings and speeches, and were present right from the start, and throughout his tenure as leader, as will be shown. There will also be no reference to: sociological and cultural backgrounds to Hitler's policies on 'blood and soil' - for example, the demographic question posed by agricultural requirements versus urbanisation of Germany at the tail end of industrialisation - nor mention of any domestic policies, even if such policies had an influence on policies abroad.
Hitler’s foreign policy and the Nazis' Wars
Hitler's ideas had spent a long time in germination, even longer in infancy and were therefore very developed by the time he became Chancellor of Germany in 1933. After seizing power, "Hitler, who treated foreign affairs almost entirely as his private preserve, immediately took up the theme of his objectives as set out in “Mein Kampf”.." (Hildebrand, 1984: 16).
In researching this paper, no copy of Hitler's books could be obtained, presumably for legal reasons, but there is excellent analysis of the "Mein Kampf" treatise found in Hauner's "Hitler: A Chronology of his Life and Time" (1983). From studying Hauner, one is hard pressed to find statements which suggest Hitler ever wanted anything other than world domination for Germany. However, on the subject of lebensraum, we find that Hitler states "..If we speak of soil in Europe today, we can primarily have in mind only Russia.." (Hauner, 1983: 55). This suggests Eurasian, rather than world, domination, but is this statement an anomaly, or can we find further evidence of this less-ambitious plan?
Hitler also suggests in “Mein Kampf” that the German race, or 'Aryans' are in danger of extinction from other races, either by military destruction or 'eugenic dilution' of the 'purity' of Aryan blood. From this standpoint he went on to announce the following, in successive public speeches in Munich. First, on 9th April 1927 he extends a premature but prophetic threat to his enemies in Europe: "...if you do not give us space on this earth then we ourselves will take this space..." Then, just over a month later on 16th May he becomes more specific as to his vision: "...[German] freedom can be obtained only by destroying France..." Finally, on 21st November 1927 he summarises: "...politics is nothing else than the struggle of a people for its existence in this world..." (Hauner, 1983: 56-57).
Hitler here highlights France as a target, adding it to the list which began with Russia, and eventually encompassed most of Europe. He is also talking about freedom, but the Germans were not under slavery, not under direct threat. Though some 'transnational paranoia' remained in the minds of many European statesmen, the majority were taking an interest in peace and working on using the lessons, learnt from World War One, and highlighted by the liberal internationalist movement, to ensure it could flourish (Brown, 2001; 26). It may be useful to consider at this stage the hypocrisy which was later demonstrated by the military action of the Nazis, in enslaving and destroying huge parts of the populations of many European countries, with the invasions of Czechoslovakia, Poland, Russia and others. It does not cohere with the image of a threatened state worried about its extinction at the hands of others. Can we therefore not dismiss the idea of self-defence and national survival from the pages of Mein Kampf as anything other than propaganda and lies designed to catalyse Nazism's rise to power?
Some have argued that Hitler's aim was not world domination, but merely hegemony in Europe by means of a 'restructuring' of Central and Eastern Europe aimed at the 'survival' of the German people, by strengthening their position in relation to other races and acquiring the 'necessary' land to ensure this survival. (Weinberg, 1970: 6-7) These historians concentrate predominantly on presenting Nazi foreign policy as an aggressive vehicle for Social Darwinism, and more importantly, as a reaction to limits imposed on Germany by the Treaty of Versailles in 1919. But the limits imposed did not threaten Germany's survival, either as a state, or as a people. From a state-centric view, World War One had damaged Germany's enemies no less equally. It had been a long war of attrition and devastation in which no combatant survived very intact. From a national standpoint Germans were the most populous people in Europe at this time. There is no doubt that the Nazis desired the strengthening of what they called the 'Aryan' race, and at the same time a weakening, by military means, of a number of races, including Czechs, Slavs, and of course, the exacting of 'revenge' on the Jews for 'what they had done to Germany' thus far in the century. Hitler also wanted the unification of all German peoples, as shown by his moves in the Sudetenland, Poland and of course the Anchluss of Austria. It has been offered that an important reason for this is that the Wilsonian ideology of national self-determination had been denied Germany. (Geary, 2000: 5) In meeting the argument of a displaced German population, there were comparatively few Germans in other countries such as Czechoslovakia or Poland to 'bring back into the fold', compared with the number living in Germany. There is, however, very little evidence of these 'displaced Germans' being particularly dissatisfied with their situation. This was no noble cause on Hitler's part. His real intentions were more concerned with power and domination. Most historians have concluded that Hitler exaggerated the ‘victim’ status of Germany in order to propagandise the people into support for Nazism. (Best et al, 2004: 160)
In summer 1928 Hitler finished his second book, which remained a secret from the world until uncovered by Gerhard Weinberg in 1958. Generally referred to as 'Hitler's Secret Book', it "deals almost exclusively with the domain of foreign policy and goes beyond Mein Kampf....especially in view of Hitler's ambitions for Germany's world dominion by instalments, first by establishing German hegemony over Europe, then by expanding eastwards against Bolshevik Russia in the quest for a new living-space, and finally by challenging the USA." (Hauner, 1983: 59) This creates a clear picture of Hitler’s plan, extremely long-term in scope, very costly, and one which would have required very extensive planning. It also directly mentions world domination as a goal. Not a task to be undertaken lightly at all.
With little regard for the norms of world politics except where it had a direct effect on his long-term plan, Hitler withdrew Germany from the League of Nations and the associated disarmament talks (a product of the liberal internationalist movement) - in 1933, soon after taking power. This early move indicates that his long-term plans were of paramount importance, and his unwillingness to jeopardize them thereafter, through treaties or other multilateral agreements, confirm this. (Weinberg, 1970: 359)
For those who believe that Nazi foreign policy was not aimed at world domination, it could also be argued that in fact Hitler’s aims were manifold, and individual: recovery of lost territories in Alsace-Lorraine and Poland; re-militarisation of the Rhineland to 'secure' it from potential French aggression; securing lebensraum in the lands to the East to ensure German survival; and most importantly the defeat of what Hitler perceived as the threat of "Marxism and...the Jews, who he believed, controlled Russia and international Marxism" (Geary, 2000: 84)
Considered in this individual sense, one would struggle to argue that they amount to a desire for Nazi world domination, but with a closer look at actions between 1936-45, a different story emerges as to the sincerity of the ‘moral’ motives for these individual aims, and as to whether we can view them as individual at all.
Publicly, the Nazis spoke of resettling the Jewish population of Europe into some sort of large reservation in Eastern Europe, but in reality, the mass-murder of Jews which became the Holocaust, began in summer 1941, almost immediately after the invasion of the Soviet Union. (Longerich, 1997: 255-259) If the invasion had been intended as the first step to opening up land, both as lebensraum for the Aryan peoples, and as a resettlement destination for European Jews, why did the Nazis start killing in such large numbers shortly afterward?
This seems to be another example of the hypocrisy evident in nearly all Nazi foreign policy. Publicly they are saying one thing, while in reality they continue to put into motion their Fuhrer's plans which have been in existence for over a decade. The earlier decision to invade Poland was itself justified by propaganda as an attempt to recover lost German territories, but in plain terms, to get to Russia and the lebensraum he wanted, Hitler had to go through Poland. (Hildebrand, 1984: 49)
Lebensraum had existed as an idea for a long time prior to its announcement to senior generals of the German army in 1933. Hitler told them it was to be considered the primary aim of Nazi foreign policy. Primary aim it surely was, but was it one of several individual aims with specific goals, or was it in fact the first step towards world domination?
We have seen that the Germans were not at any real risk of extinction as a people as Hitler claimed in his propaganda, so is the taking of land from Russia as 'living room' not merely an excuse, a reward that Hitler offered his people for their support? If the Nazi occupation of Russia had been successful, this would have likely been seen as a prize for the German people. It would also have been the key to Eurasian domination, further assimilation and subjugation of conquered people and resources towards global expansion and conquest. (Hildebrand, 1984: 18) The obvious extrapolation from this is world domination, but is it a fair one?
"Clearly, if space is to be adjusted to an expanded population by conquest, and such conquest again enables the population to expand and facilitates further conquest, the only possible limitations are utter defeat on the one hand or total occupation of the globe on the other." (Weinberg, 1970: 7)
In September 1939 at the Berghof conference, Hitler cleared up much of the ambiguity. "Poland will be depopulated and settled with Germans. My pact with the Poles was merely conceived to gain time. As for the rest, the fate of Russia will be exactly the same....we will break the Soviet Union. Then there will begin the dawn of the German rule of the earth. The little States cannot scare me."
Any doubt that by ‘The little States’ he meant the USA, was eradicated on Dec 1941, when Hitler declared war on the USA. In the interim, his aggression had struck at Denmark, Norway, Holland, Belgium, France, and indeed most of Europe, having already taken Czechoslovakia and Austria prior to 1939.
Finally, Nazi attitudes to race and Aryan domination were not limited to Europe either. Study of Hitler's comments on both the Far East and the United States reveal a view of the people of Eastern Asia as racially inferior, and an assessment of the United States as a weak country, a 'mongrel society' that would be incapable of stopping The Third Reich from its 'master race' destiny, once the war in Europe had achieved 'racial purification' (Weinberg, 1970: 20-21).
Conclusion
Nazi foreign policy was not limited to regaining assets lost to them in 1919, as demonstrated by their ruthless and relentless invasion of the majority of Europe. Their racism and desire to see whole nations eradicated was not limited to European or even Eurasian targets. Their claim that Germany was a victim of deliberate extinction was unfounded, and chief among their stated aims was the conquest of Russia, a country so large that any rational decision to do so would not, in the opinion of this paper, have been as part of a half-hearted plan of domination. Had the Nazis succeeded in World War Two and conquered Eurasia by defeating the Allies on the Western front and the Soviets in the East, a showdown with the United States would have been inevitable. As demonstrated by both private (Hitler's Secret Book) and public (1939 Berghof conference) statements, this confrontation was one the Nazis were prepared to fight to succeed in their ultimate goal.
In a period where other countries were flirting, however casually, with decolonisation and attempts to establish an international system of peace, Nazi foreign policy was aimed at the deception of it's enemies by hypocrisy and lies, the buildup of military strength by a total dedication of state industry, and ultimately, the use of that strength to crush its enemies wherever it encountered them, and thus implement world domination.
Bibliography
Baylis, J. and Smith, S. (2001) The Globalisation of World Politics - Third Edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press
BBC Worldwide (2004) The Nazis: A Warning From History. DVD Recording
Best, A., Hanhimäki, J.M., Maiolo, J., Schulze, K.E. (2004) International History of the Twentieth Century. Oxford: Routledge
Brown, C. (2001) Understanding International Relations - Second Edition. Basingstoke: Palgrave
Geary, D. (2000) Hitler and Nazism. Oxford: Routledge
Hauner, M (1978) 'Did Hitler Want World Domination?'. Journal of Contemporary History, 13
Hauner, M (1983) Hitler: A Chronology of his Life and Time. London: Macmillan
Hildebrand, K. trans Falla, P.S. (1984) The Third Reich. London: Allen & Unwin
Longerich, P. (1997) "From Mass Murder to the 'Final Solution': The Shooting of Jewish Civilians during the First Months of the Eastern Campaign within the Context of Nazi Jewish Genocide". In From Peace to War: Germany, Soviet Russia and the World 1939-1941. edited by Bernd Wegner. Oxford: Berghahn
Marks, S. (2002) The Ebbing of European Ascendancy. London: Hodder Arnold
Weinberg, G. (1970) The Foreign Policy of Hitler's Germany - Diplomatic Revolution in Europe 1933-36. Chicago: University of Chicago
In answer of the question, "Was Nazi foreign policy aimed at world domination?", analysis will concentrate mainly on two subjects - the foreign policy devised and orchestrated by Adolf Hitler - between the publication of the Second Volume of “Mein Kampf” in December 1926, and his death in April 1945; and secondly, on the military and diplomatic actions of the Nazi state during the period 1936-1945. World domination will be defined as 'majority world control', not as 'world government'. Therefore, it will be shown that Nazi foreign policy was aimed at making The Third Reich ('Reich' meaning 'empire') the most powerful political force in the world, thus dominating the globe. This paper makes no suggestion that the Nazis planned to make the whole of the globe subject to the Reich's government, nor is this suggestion necessary to the question. Dominion is not the same as rule.
Despite the controversial nature of the title question, length constraints considerably limit any historiographical analysis of Nazi foreign policy. Whilst the argument is made by some historians that the "chaotic nature of decision-making" (Geary, 2000: 10) and Hitler's allegedly 'repeated indecisions' present to us a view of foreign policy not as Hitler's programme but as a more flexible and organic 'direction', it will be the belief of this paper that as Fuhrer, Hitler was almost completely in control of Nazi foreign policy. Some of the Reich's actions late in World War Two may not have been directly organised by him, but these actions remain in keeping with the political desires that were conceived in Hitler's writings and speeches, and were present right from the start, and throughout his tenure as leader, as will be shown. There will also be no reference to: sociological and cultural backgrounds to Hitler's policies on 'blood and soil' - for example, the demographic question posed by agricultural requirements versus urbanisation of Germany at the tail end of industrialisation - nor mention of any domestic policies, even if such policies had an influence on policies abroad.
Hitler’s foreign policy and the Nazis' Wars
Hitler's ideas had spent a long time in germination, even longer in infancy and were therefore very developed by the time he became Chancellor of Germany in 1933. After seizing power, "Hitler, who treated foreign affairs almost entirely as his private preserve, immediately took up the theme of his objectives as set out in “Mein Kampf”.." (Hildebrand, 1984: 16).
In researching this paper, no copy of Hitler's books could be obtained, presumably for legal reasons, but there is excellent analysis of the "Mein Kampf" treatise found in Hauner's "Hitler: A Chronology of his Life and Time" (1983). From studying Hauner, one is hard pressed to find statements which suggest Hitler ever wanted anything other than world domination for Germany. However, on the subject of lebensraum, we find that Hitler states "..If we speak of soil in Europe today, we can primarily have in mind only Russia.." (Hauner, 1983: 55). This suggests Eurasian, rather than world, domination, but is this statement an anomaly, or can we find further evidence of this less-ambitious plan?
Hitler also suggests in “Mein Kampf” that the German race, or 'Aryans' are in danger of extinction from other races, either by military destruction or 'eugenic dilution' of the 'purity' of Aryan blood. From this standpoint he went on to announce the following, in successive public speeches in Munich. First, on 9th April 1927 he extends a premature but prophetic threat to his enemies in Europe: "...if you do not give us space on this earth then we ourselves will take this space..." Then, just over a month later on 16th May he becomes more specific as to his vision: "...[German] freedom can be obtained only by destroying France..." Finally, on 21st November 1927 he summarises: "...politics is nothing else than the struggle of a people for its existence in this world..." (Hauner, 1983: 56-57).
Hitler here highlights France as a target, adding it to the list which began with Russia, and eventually encompassed most of Europe. He is also talking about freedom, but the Germans were not under slavery, not under direct threat. Though some 'transnational paranoia' remained in the minds of many European statesmen, the majority were taking an interest in peace and working on using the lessons, learnt from World War One, and highlighted by the liberal internationalist movement, to ensure it could flourish (Brown, 2001; 26). It may be useful to consider at this stage the hypocrisy which was later demonstrated by the military action of the Nazis, in enslaving and destroying huge parts of the populations of many European countries, with the invasions of Czechoslovakia, Poland, Russia and others. It does not cohere with the image of a threatened state worried about its extinction at the hands of others. Can we therefore not dismiss the idea of self-defence and national survival from the pages of Mein Kampf as anything other than propaganda and lies designed to catalyse Nazism's rise to power?
Some have argued that Hitler's aim was not world domination, but merely hegemony in Europe by means of a 'restructuring' of Central and Eastern Europe aimed at the 'survival' of the German people, by strengthening their position in relation to other races and acquiring the 'necessary' land to ensure this survival. (Weinberg, 1970: 6-7) These historians concentrate predominantly on presenting Nazi foreign policy as an aggressive vehicle for Social Darwinism, and more importantly, as a reaction to limits imposed on Germany by the Treaty of Versailles in 1919. But the limits imposed did not threaten Germany's survival, either as a state, or as a people. From a state-centric view, World War One had damaged Germany's enemies no less equally. It had been a long war of attrition and devastation in which no combatant survived very intact. From a national standpoint Germans were the most populous people in Europe at this time. There is no doubt that the Nazis desired the strengthening of what they called the 'Aryan' race, and at the same time a weakening, by military means, of a number of races, including Czechs, Slavs, and of course, the exacting of 'revenge' on the Jews for 'what they had done to Germany' thus far in the century. Hitler also wanted the unification of all German peoples, as shown by his moves in the Sudetenland, Poland and of course the Anchluss of Austria. It has been offered that an important reason for this is that the Wilsonian ideology of national self-determination had been denied Germany. (Geary, 2000: 5) In meeting the argument of a displaced German population, there were comparatively few Germans in other countries such as Czechoslovakia or Poland to 'bring back into the fold', compared with the number living in Germany. There is, however, very little evidence of these 'displaced Germans' being particularly dissatisfied with their situation. This was no noble cause on Hitler's part. His real intentions were more concerned with power and domination. Most historians have concluded that Hitler exaggerated the ‘victim’ status of Germany in order to propagandise the people into support for Nazism. (Best et al, 2004: 160)
In summer 1928 Hitler finished his second book, which remained a secret from the world until uncovered by Gerhard Weinberg in 1958. Generally referred to as 'Hitler's Secret Book', it "deals almost exclusively with the domain of foreign policy and goes beyond Mein Kampf....especially in view of Hitler's ambitions for Germany's world dominion by instalments, first by establishing German hegemony over Europe, then by expanding eastwards against Bolshevik Russia in the quest for a new living-space, and finally by challenging the USA." (Hauner, 1983: 59) This creates a clear picture of Hitler’s plan, extremely long-term in scope, very costly, and one which would have required very extensive planning. It also directly mentions world domination as a goal. Not a task to be undertaken lightly at all.
With little regard for the norms of world politics except where it had a direct effect on his long-term plan, Hitler withdrew Germany from the League of Nations and the associated disarmament talks (a product of the liberal internationalist movement) - in 1933, soon after taking power. This early move indicates that his long-term plans were of paramount importance, and his unwillingness to jeopardize them thereafter, through treaties or other multilateral agreements, confirm this. (Weinberg, 1970: 359)
For those who believe that Nazi foreign policy was not aimed at world domination, it could also be argued that in fact Hitler’s aims were manifold, and individual: recovery of lost territories in Alsace-Lorraine and Poland; re-militarisation of the Rhineland to 'secure' it from potential French aggression; securing lebensraum in the lands to the East to ensure German survival; and most importantly the defeat of what Hitler perceived as the threat of "Marxism and...the Jews, who he believed, controlled Russia and international Marxism" (Geary, 2000: 84)
Considered in this individual sense, one would struggle to argue that they amount to a desire for Nazi world domination, but with a closer look at actions between 1936-45, a different story emerges as to the sincerity of the ‘moral’ motives for these individual aims, and as to whether we can view them as individual at all.
Publicly, the Nazis spoke of resettling the Jewish population of Europe into some sort of large reservation in Eastern Europe, but in reality, the mass-murder of Jews which became the Holocaust, began in summer 1941, almost immediately after the invasion of the Soviet Union. (Longerich, 1997: 255-259) If the invasion had been intended as the first step to opening up land, both as lebensraum for the Aryan peoples, and as a resettlement destination for European Jews, why did the Nazis start killing in such large numbers shortly afterward?
This seems to be another example of the hypocrisy evident in nearly all Nazi foreign policy. Publicly they are saying one thing, while in reality they continue to put into motion their Fuhrer's plans which have been in existence for over a decade. The earlier decision to invade Poland was itself justified by propaganda as an attempt to recover lost German territories, but in plain terms, to get to Russia and the lebensraum he wanted, Hitler had to go through Poland. (Hildebrand, 1984: 49)
Lebensraum had existed as an idea for a long time prior to its announcement to senior generals of the German army in 1933. Hitler told them it was to be considered the primary aim of Nazi foreign policy. Primary aim it surely was, but was it one of several individual aims with specific goals, or was it in fact the first step towards world domination?
We have seen that the Germans were not at any real risk of extinction as a people as Hitler claimed in his propaganda, so is the taking of land from Russia as 'living room' not merely an excuse, a reward that Hitler offered his people for their support? If the Nazi occupation of Russia had been successful, this would have likely been seen as a prize for the German people. It would also have been the key to Eurasian domination, further assimilation and subjugation of conquered people and resources towards global expansion and conquest. (Hildebrand, 1984: 18) The obvious extrapolation from this is world domination, but is it a fair one?
"Clearly, if space is to be adjusted to an expanded population by conquest, and such conquest again enables the population to expand and facilitates further conquest, the only possible limitations are utter defeat on the one hand or total occupation of the globe on the other." (Weinberg, 1970: 7)
In September 1939 at the Berghof conference, Hitler cleared up much of the ambiguity. "Poland will be depopulated and settled with Germans. My pact with the Poles was merely conceived to gain time. As for the rest, the fate of Russia will be exactly the same....we will break the Soviet Union. Then there will begin the dawn of the German rule of the earth. The little States cannot scare me."
Any doubt that by ‘The little States’ he meant the USA, was eradicated on Dec 1941, when Hitler declared war on the USA. In the interim, his aggression had struck at Denmark, Norway, Holland, Belgium, France, and indeed most of Europe, having already taken Czechoslovakia and Austria prior to 1939.
Finally, Nazi attitudes to race and Aryan domination were not limited to Europe either. Study of Hitler's comments on both the Far East and the United States reveal a view of the people of Eastern Asia as racially inferior, and an assessment of the United States as a weak country, a 'mongrel society' that would be incapable of stopping The Third Reich from its 'master race' destiny, once the war in Europe had achieved 'racial purification' (Weinberg, 1970: 20-21).
Conclusion
Nazi foreign policy was not limited to regaining assets lost to them in 1919, as demonstrated by their ruthless and relentless invasion of the majority of Europe. Their racism and desire to see whole nations eradicated was not limited to European or even Eurasian targets. Their claim that Germany was a victim of deliberate extinction was unfounded, and chief among their stated aims was the conquest of Russia, a country so large that any rational decision to do so would not, in the opinion of this paper, have been as part of a half-hearted plan of domination. Had the Nazis succeeded in World War Two and conquered Eurasia by defeating the Allies on the Western front and the Soviets in the East, a showdown with the United States would have been inevitable. As demonstrated by both private (Hitler's Secret Book) and public (1939 Berghof conference) statements, this confrontation was one the Nazis were prepared to fight to succeed in their ultimate goal.
In a period where other countries were flirting, however casually, with decolonisation and attempts to establish an international system of peace, Nazi foreign policy was aimed at the deception of it's enemies by hypocrisy and lies, the buildup of military strength by a total dedication of state industry, and ultimately, the use of that strength to crush its enemies wherever it encountered them, and thus implement world domination.
Bibliography
Baylis, J. and Smith, S. (2001) The Globalisation of World Politics - Third Edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press
BBC Worldwide (2004) The Nazis: A Warning From History. DVD Recording
Best, A., Hanhimäki, J.M., Maiolo, J., Schulze, K.E. (2004) International History of the Twentieth Century. Oxford: Routledge
Brown, C. (2001) Understanding International Relations - Second Edition. Basingstoke: Palgrave
Geary, D. (2000) Hitler and Nazism. Oxford: Routledge
Hauner, M (1978) 'Did Hitler Want World Domination?'. Journal of Contemporary History, 13
Hauner, M (1983) Hitler: A Chronology of his Life and Time. London: Macmillan
Hildebrand, K. trans Falla, P.S. (1984) The Third Reich. London: Allen & Unwin
Longerich, P. (1997) "From Mass Murder to the 'Final Solution': The Shooting of Jewish Civilians during the First Months of the Eastern Campaign within the Context of Nazi Jewish Genocide". In From Peace to War: Germany, Soviet Russia and the World 1939-1941. edited by Bernd Wegner. Oxford: Berghahn
Marks, S. (2002) The Ebbing of European Ascendancy. London: Hodder Arnold
Weinberg, G. (1970) The Foreign Policy of Hitler's Germany - Diplomatic Revolution in Europe 1933-36. Chicago: University of Chicago